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 Over the past thirty years, the dominant rationale for mandatory, 
formal cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of federal health, safety and 
environmental regulations has changed from “CBA operates as a 
necessary institutional roadblock against power-hungry regulators” to 
“CBA is a neutral tool that assists regulators in identifying welfare-
maximizing regulatory options.” However, despite this change in intention 
and justification, the actual CBA methodologies the OMB directs the 
agencies to use haven’t changed much in three decades, and still reflect the 
strong anti-regulation sentiment of the Reagan administration. One 
methodological choice that continues to operate as a very powerful bias 
against protective regulatory standards is the OMB directive that executive 
agencies must discount the public health and environmental benefits of 
regulation at the same rate used for monetary costs.  
 The standard argument against using a lower discount rate for health, 
safety and environmental benefits is that this would cause agencies to defer 
cost-beneficial regulations ad infinitum; under differential discounting, it is 
argued, a beneficial regulation would always produce more net benefits if 
its implementation were delayed another year, and so no rational agency 
would ever implement anything. This article demonstrates that this 
“perpetual delay” argument relies on an invalid assumption; once this 
assumption is eliminated, any perpetual delay phenomenon disappears. 
 Next, several “opportunity cost” arguments for equal discounting are 
shown to conflate the choices theoretically available to society as a whole 
with the outcomes actually available to regulatory agency decision makers. 
While the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually 
displaced by regulations may be relevant considerations for regulators, the 
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arguments—premised on opportunity cost—that logic compels equal 
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits all fail. 
 Finally, the article summarizes and discusses the substantial evidence 
that the discount rate agencies apply to the non-fungible, often intangible 
public health and environmental benefits of regulation should be 
significantly lower than the rate used for monetary costs within the same 
cost-benefit analysis. 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 In 1979 and 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan railed against 
the “arrogance”1 of federal regulation of business and promised to take 
major steps to rein in the executive agencies.
2
 He kept his promise. One of 
his first acts, upon taking office, was to establish a cabinet-level “Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief,” populated with some of Washington’s most 
ardent anti-regulation ideologues, and with the stated agenda of scaling 
back the regulatory state and holding the regulators at bay.
3
  
 Executive Order 12291 soon followed. It established that no major 
executive agency rule could be so much as proposed in the Federal Register 
until it passed a rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis.
4
 The Task 
Force, believing even Reagan’s own regulatory appointees would likely 
oppose the order, had worked quickly to ensure it was finalized before any 
new regulatory agency heads were in place.
5
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
1  Jane Seabarry, Reagan Decries Government; Too Much Government Denounced by 
Reagan, WASH. POST, June 14, 1979, at D1. 
2  Diane Curtis, Reagan Vows to Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 3, 1980, at A2 (“‘If I am elected, and have an administration, I’d go a lot further than 
a little tinkering with regulations,’ Reagan said. ‘I’d like to get rid of several thousand of 
what I think are unnecessary regulations that have caused your problems.’”); Merrill 
Brown, Thumbs Could Twiddle When Regulations Burn, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1980, at 
D1; Reagan’s Victory Buoys Business, CHEM. WEEK, Nov. 12, 1980, at 16 (“While he was 
on the campaign trail, President-elect Ronald Reagan seemingly pushed all the right 
buttons for business. He would . . . ease up on regulations to ‘get government off the backs 
of the people,’ as Murray L. Weidenbaum, head of Reagan’s regulatory task force, put 
it.”). 
3  Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing the Establishment of the Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, Jan. 22, 1981, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/index.php?pid=43635; Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 
MD. L. REV. 253 (1986). See also JAMES C. MILLER, FIX THE U.S. BUDGET!: URGINGS OF 
AN “ABOMINABLE NO-MAN” 2–3 (Hoover Institution Press, 1994); Reagan’s Victory 
Buoys Business, supra note 2, at 16. 
4  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).  
5  MILLER, supra note 3, at 3. A draft of the executive order was circulated to the other 
members of the cabinet over the Washington’s Birthday holiday weekend, and, despite 
complaints from some cabinet members that they had been unable to have it reviewed by 
attorneys over the long weekend, was signed by the president the next business day, Feb. 
17, 1981. Id. at 3 n. 5. 
82                     WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW                     [Vol. 3:80 
 The dominant philosophy on the task force was a public choice 
perspective of administrative rulemaking.
6
 In the words of James Miller, 
the task force member given primary responsibility for enforcing the 
regulatory reform agenda at OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA): “Given that the raison d’être of regulators is to regulate, 
they will produce regulations without end—bad ones as well as good 
ones.”7  
 Considering this attitude, it is perhaps not surprising that some of the 
specific methodologies Miller’s OIRA requested the agencies follow in 
their cost-benefit analyses were biased against health, safety and 
environmental protections, to the point where their likely economic effect 
was to reduce net social welfare by causing agencies to under-regulate.
8
 
What is surprising is that several quite powerful anti-regulation biases have 
persisted through each update of the OIRA guidelines, and have remained 
basically unchanged since the Reagan administration.
9
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
6  Reagan Tells Regulators to Analyze Costs, CHEM. WEEK, Feb. 25, 1981, at 15 
(“Under the new plan, OMB has unprecedented authority to veto and 
rewrite regulations even before executive agencies officially propose them. While this 
power is likely to be challenged in the courts, Reagan’s deregulators feel it’s needed, since 
even the best-intentioned appointees can be ‘captured’ by the agencies they head. . . . The 
order will place a heavy procedural burden on the agencies, which are struggling to meet 
statutory deadlines while facing major personnel and budget cutbacks.”); see also Frank B. 
Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of 
Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988) (the impetus for E.O. 19221 was “President 
Reagan’s perception that federal government agencies overregulate”); MILLER, supra note 
3, at 2. 
7  MILLER, supra note 3, at 2; Lawrence Mosher, Reaganites, with OMB’s List in Hand, 
Take Dead Aim at EPA’s Regulations, NAT’L J., Feb. 14, 1981, at 256 (“James C. Miller 
III, head of the OMB office that compiled an analysis of environmental regulations by 
EPA: ‘We’re going to be putting down very hard rules for them.’”). 
8  Cf. RICHARD L. REVSZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 11 
(Oxford University Press 2008); see also discussion infra note 9. 
9  Examples of anti-regulation biases that have persisted through each version of these 
guidelines, besides the discounting requirement that is the subject of this paper, include the 
manner in which regulatory costs and benefits are quantified and monetized (as applied, 
these requirements have tended systematically to undervalue regulatory benefits, which 
tend to be more difficult than costs to quantify and monetize, while the process for 
estimating costs tends to produce inflated numbers). See LISA HEINZERLING, COMMENTS 
ON DRAFT OMB REPORT AND COST-BENEFIT GUIDELINES, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REGULATION (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2003report/251.pdf; Frank Clemente & Melissa Luttrell, 
Comments on the 2001 Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations, PUB. CITIZEN (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/ACFCF.pdf; see also David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 
U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006) (agency cost-benefit analyses systematically point agencies 
toward less protective regulations); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting 
the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002) 
(CBA cost estimates tend to be too high). In addition, agencies are specifically directed not 
to be conservative in their assumptions regarding risks to public health and the 
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 Executive Order 12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12866,
10
 
have long been unpopular with environmentalists, consumer groups, and 
other public-interest constituencies that oppose the use of CBA as a 
decision criterion. In February 2009, the Obama administration solicited 
recommendations for a replacement executive order, receiving a sizable 
response.
11
 But Executive Order 12866 was never replaced, and, on 
January 18, 2011, President Obama signed Executive Order 13563, re-
affirming his administration’s commitment to CBA of new executive 
agency regulations (a process still overseen by OIRA), and directing the 




 The current OIRA administrator is Cass Sunstein, widely regarded as 
one of the most brilliant legal minds of our day; at the time of his 
nomination, Sunstein was described by Obama as both a “dear friend” and 
“the most cited law professor on any faculty in the United States.”13 In his 
extensive scholarship on CBA, Sunstein strongly supports the use of CBA 
in administrative decision-making,
14
 although he has expressed concern 
that real-world agency analyses have often been crudely done,
15
 have 
                                                                                                                                                                          
environment, but instead to use “best estimates” of risk—another practice that likely 
causes agencies systematically to underestimate the need for regulatory protections. See 
Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 27–29 (1998). 
 OMB guidance documents implementing the cost-benefit analysis requirements of 
Executive Order 12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12866, include: OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, INTERIM REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS GUIDANCE (1981), reprinted 
in 12 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 258 (1981); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Guidance, Appendix V, in REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT 653–66 (1990); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT 
RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1992), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a94/a094.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12866 (1996), available at http://www.neutralsource.org/content/article/detail/727; OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS (Sept. 17, 2003). See also 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Check 
list.pdf (last visited November 16, 2010). 
10  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). 
11  Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Request for Comments on OMB Recommendations for a 
New Executive Order on Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819-01 (Feb. 26, 2009); see 
also set of 183 public comments compiled at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp (last visited Dec. 18, 2011). 
12  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
13  Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama 
Announces another Key OMB Post (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/ the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-Another-Key-OMB-Post. 
14  See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2002).  
15 Robert Hahn & Cass Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1514–15 
(2002) (“The information provided in an RIA is often badly incomplete, and the level of 
detail and analytical sophistication varies across agencies and types of regulations.”). 
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sometimes been improperly biased against regulation,
16
 and can produce 
almost indeterminate results.
17
 Interestingly, in this (pre-OIRA 
appointment) scholarship on CBA, Sunstein noted that agencies technically 
are not bound by OMB’s methodological guidelines on CBA;18 however, in 
his present position, he is working to ensure that agencies comply more 
fully with these guidelines’ “requirements”19 and so it must be assumed 
that the OMB’s methodological guidelines will continue to play a 
significant role in shaping federal health, safety and environmental 
standards.  
 The latest OMB guidelines enumerating the specific methodologies 
agencies are to use in their cost-benefit analyses of regulations (“OMB 
Guidelines”) were released in 2003.20 While there are a number of 
methodological choices in the OMB Guidelines that are likely to cause 
agency analyses to be systematically biased against health, safety and 
environmental protections,
21
 this paper focuses on only one: the directive 
that agencies must apply the same discount rate to regulatory costs as to 
regulatory benefits. The merits of CBA, as a decision-making tool, are 
hotly contested. But whether one supports the current role of CBA in 
agency health, safety and environmental rulemaking, or whether one 
opposes this role on ethical, legal, and/or policy grounds (as I do),
22
 it 
seems uncontroversial that the agencies producing CBAs (whether under 
duress or out of an affirmative desire to employ the technique) should 
endeavor to eliminate any improper, anti-regulation biases contained within 
the methodology, and that OIRA should support any methodological 
changes that would improve the accuracy and rationality of agency CBAs.   
 Discounting can have an enormous impact on how good (or bad) a 
regulation appears. The primary reason for discounting is to account for the 
changing value of money, depending on when in time the money will be 
received or spent. The present value of a dollar received today is greater 
                                                                                                                                                                          
16  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 227 (“the use of a [OMB-recommended] 7 percent 
discount rate, if it decisively affects the ultimate decision, would seem to be legally 
doubtful”). 
17  Id. at 153–90.  
18  Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, 
and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 172 (2007); see also SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 14, at 225.  
19  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST, supra note 9. Of course, 
seeking expanded compliance is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that compliance 
is voluntary. 
20
  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9. Note that EPA 
publishes its own guidelines on the economic analysis of regulations; these guidelines, like 
OMB’s guidelines, call for the use of equal discounting. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 6–20 (2010) (“In all cases 
social benefits and costs should be discounted in the same manner[.]”). 
21  HEINZERLING, supra note 9; see also supra text of note 9.  
22  See, e.g, Clemente & Luttrell, supra note 9, at 2. 
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than that of a dollar to be received twenty years from now, even controlling 
for inflation; this is primarily because a dollar received today can be 
invested and made to grow. For this reason, economic analyses that involve 
monetary gains and losses over time generally employ discounting.  
 But the OMB requirement for equal discounting means that all goods—
even health and environmental benefits that cannot be invested—must be 
discounted at the same rate as monetary costs. Such discounting can 
dramatically lower the apparent value of health, safety and environmental 
regulation: 
Consider, for example, OSHA’s lockout/tagout regulation[.] OMB has 
estimated the regulation costs $70.9 billion for each premature death it 
prevents. OSHA, which did not discount future benefits, estimated the 




 The effect of discounting is especially pronounced for health standards 
that prevent long-latency diseases. For example, the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration’s proposed new respirable coal dust exposure limit 
will protect miners from diseases, such as black lung disease and 
emphysema, that often take decades to materialize.
24
 In addition, the miners 
who have already had occupational exposure to coal dust at current levels 
will continue to have a heightened risk for disease and premature death 
long after the new permissible exposure limit takes effect, and possibly for 
the rest of their lives; MSHA has therefore concluded that its rule will offer 
the greatest protection to workers who enter the mining occupation after the 
rule takes effect, and it estimates it will take approximately 45 years for the 
entire workforce to turn over.
25
 Since the delay between occupational 
exposure and consequential premature death may be 40 years (or more)
26—
and since it will take about 45 years for the relevant workforce to turn 
over—if the number of affected workers remains at current levels, it may 
well take 85 years or more for the full annual lifesaving benefits of the 
regulation to be actually observed.  
 Figure 1, below, illustrates the effect of equal discounting on rules—
like MSHA’s new respirable coal dust standard—that have substantial 
upfront costs but are expected to take many decades to demonstrate their 
full lifesaving potential. This area chart shows annual net benefits over time 
                                                                                                                                                                          
23  Testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro before the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, April 22, 1999. 
24  Mine Safety & Health Admin., Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine 
Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,412 (proposed Oct. 
19, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 70, 71, 72, 75, and 9). 
25  See MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., PRELIMINARY REGULATORY ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS FOR LOWERING MINERS’ EXPOSURE TO RESPIRABLE COAL MINE DUST 
INCLUDING CONTINUOUS PERSONAL DUST MONITORS 11 (2010). 
26  See id., see also Arévalo Galeano et al., Abstract: Anthracosilicosis: A Rare Clinical 
and Radiological Presentation Simulating Lung Metastases, 51 RADIOLOGIA 601 (2009) 
(latency of more than 50 years).  
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for a hypothetical proposed rule that would prevent premature death from 
exposure to toxins, when costs are discounted at 5% and benefits are 
discounted at either 5%, 1.5%, or 0%. This hypothetical rule has total social 
costs of $93 million in 2011, its first year in effect, with annual costs 
declining until they stabilize, in 2017, at $25 million. The benefits, in the 
form of averted deaths, first become patent 23 years after the rule begins to 
generate costs, with the annual number of deaths averted gradually 
increasing until it stabilizes, in 2099, at 30 averted deaths per year. (CBA 
requires that lives saved be converted into dollar equivalents; here, averted 




Figure 1: Present Value of Annual Net Benefits for Hypothetical Health  
Standard over Time, under Equal and Differential Discounting 
 
 Under equal discounting, when both costs and benefits are discounted 
at 5%, this hypothetical rule fails CBA. That the rule, over its lifetime, 
would have net social costs under equal discounting (at 5%) can be seen 
graphically: under equal discounting, the area above the horizontal $0 line 
is smaller than the area below it. However, if the agency analyst were 
permitted to use differential discounting, this rule could easily pass CBA. 
When regulatory benefits are discounted at 0%, the rule’s benefits are 
overwhelmingly greater than its costs (again, this can be seen graphically 
by comparing the area above the $0 line with the area below it), and this 
difference would be even greater if the rule’s continuing benefits were 
plotted out for additional years. Even when benefits are discounted at 1.5%, 
the hypothetical rule still easily passes CBA. In short, the decision to 
discount the health and environmental benefits of regulation at the same 
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rate as monetary costs can have a major impact on how cost-beneficial a 
rule appears, and can determine whether a rule passes CBA at all. 
 In responding to critics of equal discounting, both OMB and the leading 
commentators supporting equal discounting concede that health goods 
cannot be invested like money and thereby made to grow.
27
 Instead, the 
case for discounting all goods at the monetary rate is largely a negative 
case: failure to discount costs and benefits at the same rate, it is argued, 
would cause absurd, paradoxical results.
28
 While there are a number of 
positive arguments for applying some discount rate to intangible regulatory 
benefits that will accrue to the future, they generally do not mandate equal 
discounting.
29
 The exceptions, the positive arguments for equal 
discounting, are all variations of a flawed opportunity cost argument. 
 This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will show that differential 
discounting
30
 will not create any paradoxes or generate absurd results. The 
standard argument against using a lower discount rate for health benefits is 
that this would cause agencies to defer good (or, “cost-beneficial”) 
regulations ad infinitum, because at any point in time such a regulation 
would always produce more benefits if it were started in the future than if it 
were started in the present. This argument is incorrect. Actually, the only 
cost-beneficial regulations that would be perpetually deferred under 
differential discounting (even assuming that a 0% rate is used for health, 
safety and environmental benefits) are those that: (1) must expire after 
some fixed period of time (e.g., the agency must issue a regulation that will 
last for one year only, and it is impossible for the program to be extended); 
                                                                                                                                                                          
27  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34; John D. 
Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
395, 503 (2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 226. 
28  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34; John D. 
Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush 
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 991 (2006). 
29  The rationales for discounting health, safety and environmental benefits cited by 
OMB in its latest methodological guidelines are opportunity cost (see infra Part II), the 
necessity of avoiding paradoxical results (see infra Part I), declining marginal utility (see 
infra Part III), and pure time preference. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 31–36. The discussion of these rationales in this paper is 
generally limited to a consideration of whether or not they should be understood to 
prohibit differential discounting. Note that pure time preference and declining marginal 
utility, while relevant to a discussion of what the discount rates for health and 
environmental goods should be, are not relevant to the debate over whether the rates used 
for these goods must always be precisely equal to whatever rate is used for money. For a 
more complete discussion of the various rationales for discounting, see Richard L. Revesz 
& Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1097 (2011).  
30  As used in this paper, “differential discounting” means discounting where the rate 
used for benefits is less than the rate used for costs within the same analysis; discounting 
where the rate for benefits is greater than the rate for costs, while theoretically possible, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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and (2) are not issued pursuant to any statutory or judicial deadline. A 
review of recently proposed rules reveals that differential discounting 
would not perpetually delay any real-world regulations. 
 Part II addresses various incarnations of the opportunity cost argument 
for equal discounting, arguing that each errs in including chimerical 
“opportunities” in their calculations of the opportunity costs of regulating. 
And while the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually 
displaced by regulations may be relevant considerations for regulators, the 
arguments—premised in opportunity cost—that logic compels equal 
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits all fail.  
 Having untethered the discount rate for health and environmental goods 
from the monetary rate, this article next examines the strong evidence that 
the values of health and environmental benefits are not depreciating as 
quickly as money, or, in some cases, at all, and that any discount rate used 
for health and environmental goods should be significantly lower than the 
rate used for money within the same cost-benefit analysis. Much of this 
evidence comes from the health economics literature. Perhaps because they 
mostly work in cost-effectiveness analysis,
31
 (as opposed to CBA), their 
work has often been ignored by the law review literature on CBA 
discounting. However, the question of the rate at which these benefits 
become more or less valuable depending on when in time they will occur is 
relevant to both disciplines, and the CBA debate on discounting has much 
to gain from better understanding the relevant work of health economists. 
 
I. THE PARALYZING PARADOX AND INFINITE DELAY 
 The OMB Guidelines direct the executive agencies to use the same 
discount rate for health and environmental benefits as for monetary costs in 
their CBAs, “in order to avoid well-documented perversities.”32 And chief 
among these “perversities” is the Keeler-Cretin paradox, summarized here 
by former OIRA administrator John Graham: 
The paradox of delayed lifesaving, also named the “Keeler-Cretin 
paradox,” starts with the seemingly innocuous assumption that the analyst 
assigns a lower discount rate (possibly zero) to lives saved than is 
assigned to dollars. But then the analyst is asked to compare a promising 
lifesaving rule to the same rule delayed for a year. Under certain 
conditions, Keeler and Cretin show that the rule is a better investment if it 
                                                                                                                                                                          
31  Cost-effectiveness analysis generates ratios showing how competing programs 
compare with each other; in cost-effectiveness analysis (unlike CBA), either the costs or 
the benefits are fixed. See Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis, 53 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1080 (2003). CBA, on the other hand, is used to generate a 
dollar amount that represents the net societal benefits (or costs) of an individual proposal; 
unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, CBA requires monetization of all the goods considered 
in the analysis. OMB, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 9–12. 
32  John D. Graham, Valuing the Future: OMB’s Refined Position, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 
52 (2007); and see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, 
at 34.  
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is delayed because future lives saved have been discounted at a lower rate 
than future costs. By the same logic, it can be shown that the lifesaving 
regulation should be delayed indefinitely, which Keeler and Cretin argue 
is perverse.
33 
 Though Graham—who was head of OIRA when the current guidelines 
on CBA were released in 2003—uses the “under certain conditions” 
qualifier above, elsewhere he has omitted it, arguing, without reservation, 
that the paradox constrains agency analysts from ever using differential 
discounting in a CBA. For example, in 2006, he stated: “The following 
paradox results from applying a smaller annual rate of discount to benefits 
than to costs: delaying an investment that saves lives in the future will 
always be desirable if the analyst is permitted to assign a smaller discount 
rate to future benefits than to costs.”34 
 This “paralyzing paradox” was first described in 1982 and 1983, when 
Emmett Keeler and Shan Cretin published papers that purported to show 
that, when costs are discounted and benefits are not, policymakers relying 
on cost-effectiveness analysis will never start a program, because “[f]or any 
attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program that should 
be funded first.”35 And, when a positive, nonzero discount rate is used for 
benefits, but benefits are discounted at a lower discount rate than costs, 
Keeler and Cretin find that “a program can only be funded if the set of 
programs under consideration has sharply decreasing returns.”36 Otherwise, 
if the programs under consideration have increasing or steady-state benefits 
(or even slowly decreasing benefits), there will always be a more attractive 
future program that should be prioritized over any current program, and the 
decision maker will never be able to start anything.
37
 In sum, Keeler and 
Cretin find that using a positive, but lower, discount rate for benefits would 
lead to the paralyzing paradox whenever the programs under consideration 
do not have sharply decreasing returns (which is to say, it would almost 
always lead to the paralyzing paradox), while using a 0% discount rate for 
benefits would always paralyze the decision maker. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
33  Graham, supra note 27, at 505. 
34  Graham et al., supra note 28, at 991 (emphasis added); see also, Richard Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 988–89 (1999) (quoting Susan W. Putnam & John D. Graham, 
Chemicals Versus Microbials in Drinking Water: A Decision Sciences Perspective, 85 J. 
AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 57, 60 (1993) (“If a smaller discount rate were to be applied to 
health than to money, it would always make sense to postpone adoption of public health 
programs that invest money now for deferred health improvements. In short, society would 
continually delay risk reduction into the future and impose the burdens on future 
generations.”)).  
35  Emmett B. Keeler & Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary 
Effects, 29 MGMT. SCI. 300, 303 (1983). 
36  EMMETT B. KEELER & SHAN CRETIN, DISCOUNTING OF NONMONETARY EFFECTS, THE 
RAND CORPORATION, N-1875-HHS, at 5 (June 1982). 
37  See id. 
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 While Keeler and Cretin’s inquiry focused on cost-effectiveness 
analysis, their conclusions have come to be understood as applying with 
equal force to CBA.
38
 The Keeler-Cretin paradox has been very influential 
among legal scholars who endorse CBA as a decision-making tool. For 
example, according to Sunstein and co-author Arden Rowell, the Keeler-
Cretin claim that “regulators will never enact programs if they discount 
costs but not benefits . . . is one of the logical implications of refusing to 
discount, and the fact that it entails a politically unacceptable outcome does 
not mean that it is wrong.”39 
 And more than a decade of criticism, from both the economics literature 
and the legal academy, has not diminished the influence of the Keeler-
Cretin paradox. On the law side, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman 
challenge what they see as an implicit assumption of economic 
inefficiency—if all programs under consideration are cost-effective, they 
argue, all should be financed, regardless of whether a future program has 
greater net benefits than a current one; Heinzerling and Ackerman also 
argue that even if failing to discount did mean net benefits would always 
increase whenever regulations were delayed, real-world political pressure 
would prevent decision makers from ever becoming paralyzed by this 
phenomenon.
40
 Richard Revesz argues that, contrary to the necessary 
Keeler-Cretin assumption that delaying a program will not increase its 
undiscounted costs, delaying a regulation is likely to increase its price, 
especially in the environmental arena, where unaddressed problems tend to 
worsen over time;
41
 he also argues that, as a practical matter, resources 
cannot be transferred across projects as readily as Keeler and Cretin seem 
to assume.
42
 Current OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein and former 
administrator John Graham have found the arguments of Revesz, 
Ackerman and Heinzerling unpersuasive; Sunstein and Graham both 
respond similarly, arguing that discounting’s critics within the legal 
academy have failed to deny the basic logic of the paradox, which, they 
                                                                                                                                                                          
38 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 32, at 52 n. 7. 
39 Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 176 n. 24, 198. According to Frank Ackerman 
and Lisa Heinzerling, “current advocates of discounting increasingly point to the Keeler-
Cretin Paradox as their last best defense.” FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, 
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 192 
(2004); see also The Regulators Best Friend?, THE ECONOMIST, April 2, 2005, at 72 (“If 
regulators discounted costs but not lives saved, they would defer action indefinitely, 
[Robert] Hahn points out.”).  
40 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 192–93; see also Lisa Heinzerling, 
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999). 
41 Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 990 (1999); see also Revesz & 
Shahabian, supra note 29. 
42  Id. at 989–92.  
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 (Note that in their scholarship describing the paradox, Revesz and 
Ackerman/Heinzerling attribute to Keeler and Cretin an “opportunity cost” 
argument they did not actually make, i.e., that any money not immediately 
spent on regulation could be invested and made to grow.
44
 The Keeler-
Cretin perpetual delay phenomenon is not driven by any investment of 
unspent funds; to the contrary, Keeler and Cretin assume the funds will not 
be invested during the delay. Instead, the Keeler-Cretin paradox is driven 
by the change in present value that occurs from delay alone, when the 
discount rate for benefits is smaller than the rate used for costs, and a 
regulatory program is delayed. (The relevance—to the differential 
discounting debate—of the possibility that funds not spent on regulation 
could be invested and made to grow during the period of delay is discussed 
at length infra Part II.)) 
 Economists, too, have attacked numerous Keeler-Cretin assumptions, 
which they argue fail to correlate with the real-world programs typically 
evaluated under cost-effectiveness analysis.
45
 For example, economist Ben 
A. Van Hout showed that no paradox will occur in cost-effectiveness 
                                                                                                                                                                          
43  Graham, supra note 27, at 505 n. 478; Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 176 n. 24, 
198 (discussing critiques by Revesz and Ackerman/Heinzerling, then citing Keeler and 
Cretin in support of the argument that one problem with refusing to discount is “if the 
refusal to discount will result in the postponement of protective programs, environmental 
and otherwise, the future is to that extent hurt rather than helped.”).  
44  From Revesz:  
[A]ccording to Emmett Keeler and Shan Cretin: ‘The discounting of costs but not 
benefits . . . has a paralyzing effect on a decisionmaker. . . . For any attractive 
program, there is always a superior delayed program which should be funded first. 
The result is that no program with a finite starting date can be selected.’ The idea 
behind this position is that, instead of undertaking the environmental program, one 
could invest the funds in an alternative project, watch the investment grow, and then 
address the environmental problem at some time in the future. At this future time, 
moreover, one would engage in the same calculus and decide to postpone the 
environmental expenditure once more. 
Revesz, supra note 41, at 989 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Priceless provides a 
conceptually similar description of the paradox: 
Suppose that monetary costs are discounted, but health and environmental benefits are 
not. Suppose, also, that any number of human lives can be saved at a fixed cost per 
life at any time. Then, at a discount rate of 7 percent, we could either save 100 lives 
now, or put the money in the bank and have enough to save 107 lives next year. Since 
the saved lives are not discounted, this delay increases the value of the benefits to 
society by 7 percent, and should be preferred over the immediate life-saving 
expenditure. But the same logic shows that it is even better to leave the money in the 
bank for two years and then save 114 lives, and so on; it will always be better to wait 
another year.  
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 227. 
45  For a survey of these arguments, see Angelina Lazaro, Theoretical Arguments for the 
Discounting of Health Consequences, 20 PHARMACOECONOMICS 943, 950–51 (2002); see 
also Hugh Gravelle et al., Discounting in Economic Evaluations: Stepping Forward 
Towards Optimal Decision Rules, 16 HEALTH ECON. 307 (2007). 
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analysis when the programs under consideration are assumed to continue 
indefinitely.
46
 However, Van Hout’s argument, and the arguments of other 
economists who have criticized the Keeler-Cretin paradox, has failed to 
gain any traction in the law review literature and in OIRA.
47
 Perhaps this is 
because the health economics literature generally discusses differential 
discounting in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, which is related to 
CBA but different in several important ways,
48
 and it is not always 
immediately clear which conclusions from the literature on cost-
effectiveness analysis are transferable to CBA. 
 This part will argue that the Keeler-Cretin paradox is not a legitimate 
barrier to differential discounting in federal executive agency CBAs, and 
will use examples to show that the argument that differential discounting 
would always point regulatory decision makers toward perpetual delay of 
cost-beneficial regulations does not hold up. The conclusion that 
differential discounting in agency CBAs would not perpetually delay cost-
beneficial regulations holds, regardless of whether the regulation is 
assumed to continue indefinitely, and regardless of whether benefits are 
even discounted at all. In short, differential discounting will not direct 
decision makers perpetually to delay cost-beneficial regulations. 
 
 A. CBA OVER AN INFINITE TIME HORIZON 
 Imagine a lifesaving regulation that requires $40 million in initial 
capital costs and other costs this year, but causes no benefits this year. 
After this year, total (monetary) costs will be $20 million per year, health 
benefits will be $24 million per year,
49
 and those cost and benefit streams 
will continue indefinitely.
50
 Assume the discount rate for costs is 3%, and 
the discount rate for benefits is 1.5%. 
 The formula for calculating the present value of a perpetuity is: 
 
P  
              
             
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
46  Ben A. Van Hout, Discounting Costs and Effects: A Reconsideration, 7 HEALTH 
ECON. 581 (1998); see also Hugh Gravelle & Dave Smith, Discounting for Health Effects 
in Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 10 HEALTH ECON. 587, 592–93 (2001).  
47  Revesz’s work is an exception. See Revesz, supra note 41, at 944 n.5. 
48  See supra note 31 for a discussion of the differences between cost-effectiveness 
analysis and CBA. 
49  Or three lives saved per year, if the value of a statistical life is $8,000,000 in 2011.  
50
  This subpart assumes, like Van Hout, that the program under evaluation will continue 
for infinity. The application of this assumption to the sample program considered here 
differs significantly from Van Hout’s analysis, however, because Van Hout addressed the 
Keeler-Cretin paradox in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, which compares the 
cost-effectiveness of competing programs against each other, generally without 
monetizing health benefits. See Van Hout, supra note 46, at 585–86; see also supra note 
31 for a discussion of the differences between cost-effectiveness analysis and CBA. 
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The present value of the total costs of the regulation will be equal to the 
present value of the continuous stream of costs, 
    
   
, plus the value of the 
extra $20M in first year start-up costs, or: 
    
   
           51 
The present value of the total benefits of the regulation will be equal to the 
present value of the continuous stream of benefits minus $24M (this 
adjustment is necessary because no benefits are obtained the first year), or: 
    
    
             
The net present value (NPV) of the regulation equals the present value of 
the total benefits minus the present value of the total costs: 
                   
Next, assume the same regulation is delayed one year. The present value of 
the regulation’s total costs will now be equal to the present value of the 
annual $20M cost stream, minus $20M (this subtraction from the present 
value of the continuous cost stream is necessary to adjust for the fact that 
there will be no costs this year), plus the present value of the extra $20M in 
start-up costs that will be paid a year from now,
52
 or:  
    
   
      
    
(     ) 
        
The present value of all benefits will now be equal to the present value of 
the perpetual $24M stream of benefits, minus $24M (because there will be 
no benefits this year), and minus the discounted value of the $24M in 
benefits that will not be received next year, either, or: 
    
    
      
    
(      ) 
  1552M  
Thus, the NPV of the regulation, delayed by one year, is $886M, which is 
$3M less than the net benefits that would be obtained if the regulation were 
implemented immediately. And if the regulation is delayed by yet another 
year, its NPV will be still smaller: 
 
( 
    
    
      
    
(      ) 
 
    
(      ) 
 )  (
    
   
      
    
(     ) 
 
    
(     ) 
)        
 
Thus, when benefits are discounted at a lower rate than costs, delaying the 
regulation will not necessarily yield higher net benefits in a CBA. The 
argument, based on the work of Keeler and Cretin, that using a lower rate 
to discount benefits than the rate used for costs in a CBA will always point 
decision makers toward perpetually postponing beneficial regulations, is 
wrong. 
 What happens to the NPV analysis if benefits are not discounted at all? 
Because the costs are discounted, the costs will always resolve to a finite 
                                                                                                                                                                          
51  Rounded to the nearest million. 
52  The present value of a single receipt or payment of a future benefit (or cost) equals  
                   (       )
(               )                                
 . 
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number; however, if a discount rate of zero is used for benefits, then the 
value of the continuous stream of benefits will be infinite. Subtracting finite 
costs (no matter what they are) from infinite benefits will always yield net 
benefits of infinity. So, using zero discounting for benefits (but not costs), 
the regulation’s NPV will always be equal to infinity, no matter when the 
regulation begins. 
 This indeterminate result is not particularly helpful to the regulatory 
decision maker who is trying to determine the optimal time to start a 
regulation (an issue discussed below), but it is also not the “perverse” result 
that has been repeated and repeated in the literature, namely, that “[f]or any 
attractive program, there is always a superior delayed program which 
should be funded first.”53 Instead, when only costs are discounted, and 
programs are examined over an infinite time horizon, delaying a program 
with a continuous, positive benefits stream will not influence net benefits 
one way or the other. 
 
 B. FROM ZERO TO INFINITY 
 The net present value of a stable benefit stream over an infinite time 
horizon is equal to infinity if no discounting of benefits is done, while 
costs, no matter how large, will be finite if any discount rate is used for 
costs. So, even a regulation that costs $10 million annually, but only 
prevents, on average, one headache per year (with no other benefits) will 
always produce positive “net benefits” in a CBA if benefits are not 
discounted and any positive, nonzero discount rate is used for costs. In the 
real world, agencies simply do not waste their energy on regulations with 
such trivial benefits and such substantial costs, but this problem is a logical 




 The legal scholars who make the case for zero discounting of intangible 
regulatory benefits do not argue that any cost, no matter how great, is 
sufficient to justify any ongoing regulatory benefit, no matter how small, 
even though this conclusion might seem logically to follow from a refusal 
to discount benefits in a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, discounting’s 
skeptics argue that CBA is a poor decision-making tool, one that obfuscates 
                                                                                                                                                                          
53  Keeler & Cretin, supra note 35, at 303. 
54  E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 209, 216–17 (2007) (“The first problem [with refusing to discount benefits] is what I 
have called the ‘permanent cost slam dunk.’ Suppose that a development policy will lead 
to the permanent loss of some very inconsequential environmental amenity that has a value 
of $1 in each period. With that loss extended for an infinite time horizon, the present value 
of the environmental harm is infinite. No policy criterion with a finite payoff can ever 
offer great enough benefits to offset this infinite loss. In contrast, with discounting, the 
infinite stream of $1 losses has a present value of only 1/r, or $33 with a three percent 
discount rate.”) (citation omitted). 
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more than it clarifies, and one that should be abandoned.
55
 Alternatives to 
conventional CBA, which would present relevant data in an analytical 
framework that lays out the costs and the benefits of different regulatory 
options over time, with quantification but not monetization of intangible 
goods, and without discounting of intangibles, have been offered.
56
 
  With that understanding, I will now consider how a hypothetical agency 
analyst who is absolutely committed to using a zero discount rate within the 
context of an otherwise conventional CBA might address the “infinite 
benefits” objection. There are several possibilities: (1) arbitrarily choose a 
finite appraisal period, e.g., ten years, or fifty years, or five hundred years 
(this option would run afoul of OIRA’s current—and rarely followed—
directive to look at a time period long enough to capture most of the rule’s 
costs and benefits,
57
 since a zero percent discount rate means the 
uncaptured regulatory benefits at any point in time will always be greater 
that the benefits captured in the analysis); (2) use a very, very small 
discount rate for benefits (e.g., 0.001%); or (3) make the time horizon finite 
by identifying a date in the future when the regulation will probably stop 
generating any benefits or costs (e.g., the regulation relates to public notice 
that must be given before certain activities related to mountaintop removal 
coal mining are undertaken, and we estimate all coal removable by this 
method will be gone by year x).  
 This third option holds some promise.  
  Many regulations are wonderfully beneficial, and it seems reasonable to 
say that, for example, the U.S. ban on DDT (which tends to persist in the 
environment and does great damage to wildlife, and famously brought the 
peregrine falcon to the very edge of extinction) will bring benefits forever. 
But will it? Experts predict that about a billion years from now, as the sun 
moves toward becoming a red giant, the Earth will be too hot to support life 
of any kind.
58
 This would seem to place an extreme outside limit on the 
length of time any regulation will generate benefits and costs.  
 And other events will cause regulations to become obsolete far sooner 
than one billion years from now: technology will change, our climate will 
change, consumer populations and preferences will change, and non-
renewable natural resources will be depleted. And so, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
55  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 9; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 39. 
56  See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008); see also ACKERMAN & 
HEINZERLING, supra note 39, at 210–15. 
57  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 15 (“The 
time frame for your analysis should cover a period long enough to encompass all the 
important benefits and costs likely to result from the rule.”). 
58  Jeff Hecht, Moving the Earth: A Planetary Survival Guide, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 20, 
2008, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14983-moving-the-earth-a-
planetary-survival-guide.html?full=true; Sun Will Vaporize Earth Unless We Can Change 
Our Orbit, SCIENCE DAILY, Feb. 24, 2008, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2008/02/080223130020.htm. 
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regulations governing tobacco price supports became obsolete after 
Congress ended the program.
59
 A regulatory requirement that had been 
designed, in 1953, to ensure that clothing’s flame retardancy was 
maintained under a then-current dry cleaning method became obsolete after 
the EPA banned that method of dry cleaning.
60
 One day, vehicles will 
likely be powered by something other than petroleum products, because we 
will run out of oil, or, as petroleum supplies dwindle, petroleum-derived 
fuels will become more expensive than other fuel options, making the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s fuel economy standards 
irrelevant; and so on. Even the best regulation will someday become 
obsolete, and, at some point before infinity, all regulations will stop 
generating costs and benefits. 
  The key point, in the context of examining the Keeler-Cretin paradox, 
is that these end points are not written into the regulations; in general, 
regulations don’t have built-in expiration dates that are tied to their 
effective dates.
61
 An agency analyst comparing the net benefits of 
regulating now with the net benefits of regulating a year from now should 
consider whether the regulation has a built-in expiration date, and if it does, 
whether delaying the regulation a year will mean the regulation will be in 
effect for one year fewer, or whether delaying the regulation will instead 
mean the same regulatory costs and benefits will be experienced for exactly 
the same length of time, just delayed a year. 
  If a regulation’s provisions will be renewable or (as is far more likely) 
continuous, then an analyst who is evaluating a regulation over a finite time 
horizon should assume that delaying the regulation one year will mean one 
fewer year that the regulation is in effect, because forces other than the 
effective date of the regulation (such as the U.S. running out of near-
surface coal) are more likely than the exact timing of its effective date to 
cause the regulation to stop providing any costs or benefits. 
 
 C. CBA OVER A FINITE PERIOD 
  Keeler and Cretin assumed that the program under analysis would last 
for a finite period, and that delaying the program wouldn’t reduce its 
benefits at all, but would only delay them. But that is not how regulations 
work. Instead, the general rule is that delaying a regulation by a year means 
there will be one fewer year of the regulation. 
  It is possible to imagine a regulatory program that is set up to ‘self-
destruct’ exactly a year (or ten years, or twenty years, or five hundred 
years) after it first begins to generate benefits or costs. But this is not the 
paradigmatic case. Instead, this condition, this necessary Keeler-Cretin 
                                                                                                                                                                          
59  Dept. of Agriculture, Tobacco Transition Payment Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1463 (2005). 
60  Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, Standard for the Flammability of Clothing Textiles, 
16 C.F.R. § 1610 (2008). 
61  See infra note 62. 
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assumption that delaying the regulation would not diminish its 
undiscounted benefits in any way, will almost never be satisfied by federal 
executive agency regulations (i.e., the regulations that are analyzed under 
OIRA’s methodological guidelines, which forbid differential discounting). 
  A review, completed in July and August 2010, of all fifteen 
economically significant rules under EO 12866 review at OIRA on the day 
the sample was drawn (July 23, 2010), found that none included expiration 
dates.
62
 All of these rules were designed to establish ongoing programs, 
standards, or policies. None were set up to self-destruct a fixed time period 
after going into effect. (Six of them have additional ammunition against 
perpetual delay, in that—according to OIRA—Congress or the courts have 
provided a deadline by which the agency must regulate.) 
 Tables 1 and 2 illustrate what might happen to the NPV of an ongoing, 
lifesaving regulation under differential discounting when the regulation is 
delayed one year. For this hypothetical regulation, costs are $10M, $8M, 
$5M, and $2M in the first four years, respectively, and $1M each 
subsequent year. Benefits are $0.50M, $1.0M, and $1.5M in the first four 
years, respectively, and $2M each subsequent year. In Table 1, costs are 
discounted at a 3% rate, while benefits are not discounted at all; in Table 2, 
















                                                                                                                                                                          
62  Following are all of the regulations (arranged by agency and RIN) under EO 12866 
review at OIRA on July 23, 2010, according to www.reginfo.gov. Department of 
Agriculture: RIN 0583-AD36; Department of Defense: RIN 0720-AB45, RIN 0790-AI50; 
Department of Health and Human Services: RIN 0920-AA12, RIN 0920-AA22, 
RIN 0938-AP57; Department of Homeland Security: RIN 1651-AA83; Department of 
Justice: RIN 1190-AA44, RIN 1190-AA46; Department of Labor: RIN 1210-AB07; 
Department of Transportation: RIN 2125-AF19,RIN 2130-AC03; Department of Veterans 
Affairs: RIN 2900-AN54; Environmental Protection Agency: RIN 2060-AQ13, RIN 2060-
AO15. 
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Table 1: Immediate Implementation of Rule vs. Rule Delayed One Year 
(Costs Discounted at 3%, Undiscounted Benefits) 
  
Year 
Immediate Implementation of Rule 
 (Millions) 
















2011 $ 10.00 $ 10.00 $ 0.50 $ - $ - $ - 
2012 $ 8.00 $ 7.76 $ 1.00 $ 10.00 $ 9.70 $ 0.50 
2013 $ 5.00 $ 4.70 $ 1.50 $ 8.00 $ 7.53 $ 1.00 
2014 $ 2.00 $ 1.83 $ 2.00 $ 5.00 $ 4.56 $ 1.50 
2015 $ 1.00 $ 0.89 $ 2.00 $ 2.00 $ 1.77 $ 2.00 
2016 $ 1.00 $ 0.86 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.86 $ 2.00 
2017 $ 1.00 $ 0.83 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.83 $ 2.00 
2018 $ 1.00 $ 0.81 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.81 $ 2.00 
2019 $ 1.00 $ 0.78 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.78 $ 2.00 
2020 $ 1.00 $ 0.76 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.76 $ 2.00 
2021 $ 1.00 $ 0.74 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.74 $ 2.00 
2022 $ 1.00 $ 0.72 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.72 $ 2.00 
2023 $ 1.00 $ 0.69 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.69 $ 2.00 
2024 $ 1.00 $ 0.67 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.67 $ 2.00 
2025 $ 1.00 $ 0.65 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.65 $ 2.00 
2026 $ 1.00 $ 0.63 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.63 $ 2.00 
2027 $ 1.00 $ 0.61 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.61 $ 2.00 
2028 $ 1.00 $ 0.60 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.60 $ 2.00 
2029 $ 1.00 $ 0.58 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.58 $ 2.00 
2030 $ 1.00 $ 0.56 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.56 $ 2.00 
2031 $ 1.00 $ 0.54 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.54 $ 2.00 
2032 $ 1.00 $ 0.53 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.53 $ 2.00 
2033 $ 1.00 $ 0.51 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.51 $ 2.00 
2034 $ 1.00 $ 0.50 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.50 $ 2.00 
2035 $ 1.00 $ 0.48 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.48 $ 2.00 
2036 $ 1.00 $ 0.47 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.47 $ 2.00 
2037 $ 1.00 $ 0.45 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.45 $ 2.00 
2038 $ 1.00 $ 0.44 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.44 $ 2.00 
2039 $ 1.00 $ 0.43 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.43 $ 2.00 
2040 $ 1.00 $ 0.41 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.41 $ 2.00 
2041 $ 1.00 $ 0.40 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.40 $ 2.00 
2042 $ 1.00 $ 0.39 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.39 $ 2.00 
2043 $ 1.00 $ 0.38 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.38 $ 2.00 
2044 $ 1.00 $ 0.37 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.37 $ 2.00 
2045 $ 1.00 $ 0.36 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.36 $ 2.00 
2046 $ 1.00 $ 0.34 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.34 $ 2.00 
2047 $ 1.00 $ 0.33 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.33 $ 2.00 
2048 $ 1.00 $ 0.32 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.32 $ 2.00 
2049 $ 1.00 $ 0.31 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.31 $ 2.00 
2050 $ 1.00 $ 0.30 $ 2.00 $ 1.00 $ 0.30 $ 2.00 
Total 
 
$ 43.94 $ 77.00 
 
$ 42.33 $ 75.00 
Net Benefits  $ 33.06   $ 32.67  
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Table 2: Immediate Implementation of Rule vs. Rule Delayed One Year  




Immediate Implementation of Rule 
(Millions) 






























2011 $ 10.00 $ 10.00 $ 0.50 $ 0.50 $ - $ - $ - $ - 
2012 $ 8.00 $ 7.76 $ 1.00 $ 0.99 $ 10.00 $ 9.70 $ 0.50 $ 0.49 
2013 $ 5.00 $ 4.70 $ 1.50 $ 1.46 $ 8.00 $ 7.53 $ 1.00 $ 0.97 
2014 $ 2.00 $ 1.83 $ 2.00 $ 1.91 $ 5.00 $ 4.56 $ 1.50 $ 1.43 
2015 $ 1.00 $ 0.89 $ 2.00 $ 1.88 $ 2.00 $ 1.77 $ 2.00 $ 1.88 
2016 $ 1.00 $ 0.86 $ 2.00 $ 1.85 $ 1.00 $ 0.86 $ 2.00 $ 1.85 
2017 $ 1.00 $ 0.83 $ 2.00 $ 1.83 $ 1.00 $ 0.83 $ 2.00 $ 1.83 
2018 $ 1.00 $ 0.81 $ 2.00 $ 1.80 $ 1.00 $ 0.81 $ 2.00 $ 1.80 
2019 $ 1.00 $ 0.78 $ 2.00 $ 1.77 $ 1.00 $ 0.78 $ 2.00 $ 1.77 
2020 $ 1.00 $ 0.76 $ 2.00 $ 1.75 $ 1.00 $ 0.76 $ 2.00 $ 1.75 
2021 $ 1.00 $ 0.74 $ 2.00 $ 1.72 $ 1.00 $ 0.74 $ 2.00 $ 1.72 
2022 $ 1.00 $ 0.72 $ 2.00 $ 1.69 $ 1.00 $ 0.72 $ 2.00 $ 1.69 
2023 $ 1.00 $ 0.69 $ 2.00 $ 1.67 $ 1.00 $ 0.69 $ 2.00 $ 1.67 
2024 $ 1.00 $ 0.67 $ 2.00 $ 1.64 $ 1.00 $ 0.67 $ 2.00 $ 1.64 
2025 $ 1.00 $ 0.65 $ 2.00 $ 1.62 $ 1.00 $ 0.65 $ 2.00 $ 1.62 
2026 $ 1.00 $ 0.63 $ 2.00 $ 1.59 $ 1.00 $ 0.63 $ 2.00 $ 1.59 
2027 $ 1.00 $ 0.61 $ 2.00 $ 1.57 $ 1.00 $ 0.61 $ 2.00 $ 1.57 
2028 $ 1.00 $ 0.60 $ 2.00 $ 1.55 $ 1.00 $ 0.60 $ 2.00 $ 1.55 
2029 $ 1.00 $ 0.58 $ 2.00 $ 1.52 $ 1.00 $ 0.58 $ 2.00 $ 1.52 
2030 $ 1.00 $ 0.56 $ 2.00 $ 1.50 $ 1.00 $ 0.56 $ 2.00 $ 1.50 
2031 $ 1.00 $ 0.54 $ 2.00 $ 1.48 $ 1.00 $ 0.54 $ 2.00 $ 1.48 
2032 $ 1.00 $ 0.53 $ 2.00 $ 1.46 $ 1.00 $ 0.53 $ 2.00 $ 1.46 
2033 $ 1.00 $ 0.51 $ 2.00 $ 1.43 $ 1.00 $ 0.51 $ 2.00 $ 1.43 
2034 $ 1.00 $ 0.50 $ 2.00 $ 1.41 $ 1.00 $ 0.50 $ 2.00 $ 1.41 
2035 $ 1.00 $ 0.48 $ 2.00 $ 1.39 $ 1.00 $ 0.48 $ 2.00 $ 1.39 
2036 $ 1.00 $ 0.47 $ 2.00 $ 1.37 $ 1.00 $ 0.47 $ 2.00 $ 1.37 
2037 $ 1.00 $ 0.45 $ 2.00 $ 1.35 $ 1.00 $ 0.45 $ 2.00 $ 1.35 
2038 $ 1.00 $ 0.44 $ 2.00 $ 1.33 $ 1.00 $ 0.44 $ 2.00 $ 1.33 
2039 $ 1.00 $ 0.43 $ 2.00 $ 1.31 $ 1.00 $ 0.43 $ 2.00 $ 1.31 
2040 $ 1.00 $ 0.41 $ 2.00 $ 1.29 $ 1.00 $ 0.41 $ 2.00 $ 1.29 
2041 $ 1.00 $ 0.40 $ 2.00 $ 1.27 $ 1.00 $ 0.40 $ 2.00 $ 1.27 
2042 $ 1.00 $ 0.39 $ 2.00 $ 1.25 $ 1.00 $ 0.39 $ 2.00 $ 1.25 
2043 $ 1.00 $ 0.38 $ 2.00 $ 1.23 $ 1.00 $ 0.38 $ 2.00 $ 1.23 
2044 $ 1.00 $ 0.37 $ 2.00 $ 1.21 $ 1.00 $ 0.37 $ 2.00 $ 1.21 
2045 $ 1.00 $ 0.36 $ 2.00 $ 1.20 $ 1.00 $ 0.36 $ 2.00 $ 1.20 
2046 $ 1.00 $ 0.34 $ 2.00 $ 1.18 $ 1.00 $ 0.34 $ 2.00 $ 1.18 
2047 $ 1.00 $ 0.33 $ 2.00 $ 1.16 $ 1.00 $ 0.33 $ 2.00 $ 1.16 
2048 $ 1.00 $ 0.32 $ 2.00 $ 1.14 $ 1.00 $ 0.32 $ 2.00 $ 1.14 
2049 $ 1.00 $ 0.31 $ 2.00 $ 1.13 $ 1.00 $ 0.31 $ 2.00 $ 1.13 










Net Benefits  $ 13.58  $ 13.23 
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 As these tables show, delaying this hypothetical lifesaving regulation 
by one year would reduce—not increase—net benefits when benefits are 
discounted at 0% (Table 1) or 1.5% (Table 2) and monetary costs are 
discounted at the higher rate of 3%. Differential discounting, once again, 
does not point to a delay. When benefits are discounted at 0% (Table 1), 
delaying the regulation by one year will eliminate an entire year of 
undiscounted benefits at the stabilized amount of $2 million. When benefits 
are discounted at 1.5% (Table 2), delaying the regulation one year will 
eliminate $1.97 million in benefits. In both Table 1 and Table 2, costs, 
discounted at the 3% annual rate, are reduced by only $1.61 million when 
the rule is delayed a year—not enough, in either case, to compensate for the 
benefits foregone when the rule is delayed. Thus, examined now over a 
finite time horizon, the claim that, when costs are discounted at a higher 
rate than benefits, postponing regulations will always yield higher net 
benefits, still does not hold up. 
 Observe that for this hypothetical regulation, where costs and benefits 
stabilize over time, the costs and benefits will be the same under either the 
“regulate now” scenario or the “regulate in one year” scenario for most of 
the years the regulation will be in effect. In Tables 1 and 2, the benefits and 
costs each year after the first five years—once the startup costs have been 
covered and costs and benefits have stabilized—are exactly the same. For 
the sake of space, these tables only show costs and benefits up to the year 
2050. When benefits are discounted at 0% (Table 1), for any point between 
2015 and infinity, the NPV of the “regulate now” option will always be 
$390,000
63
 more than the “regulate in one year” option. And when benefits 
are discounted at 1.5%, the NPV of the “regulate now” option will always 
be $350,000
64
 more than the “regulate in one year” option, from 2016 
onward. No matter what end date is used in either of these CBAs, delaying 
the regulation will never increase net benefits. 
 It is possible to conceive of a regulation with high enough upfront costs 
and low enough upfront benefits that net benefits will be higher under 
differential discounting if the rule is delayed, especially if a high discount 
rate is used for costs. Such rules would tend to fail a conventional cost-
benefit test that uses equal discounting, but it is possible that some might 
have positive net benefits under differential discounting. So, it is possible 
that, under differential discounting, a finite delay might maximize net 
benefits in some cases. This can happen under equal discounting, too, and 
this is one reason agencies sometimes compare the net benefits of a 
regulation under different start dates.
65
 That is, earliest implementation 
                                                                                                                                                                          
63  This number is approximate, due to rounding. 
64  This number is approximate, due to rounding. 
65  E.g., NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FINAL REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS, ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL SYSTEMS, at VII3–VII9 (March 
2007). 
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doesn’t always maximize net benefits under either equal or differential 
discounting. However, cost-beneficial rules would not be infinitely delayed. 
For any rule that will have net benefits at any discrete point in time, and for 
which ongoing annual benefits will eventually exceed ongoing annual 
costs, it is possible that a finite delay may increase net benefits; however, 
since costs are discounted at a higher rate than benefits, the benefits that are 
foregone by delaying the rule will eventually be greater than the value of 
postponing the costs an additional year. Any delay will not be infinite. 
 Choosing a fixed-length appraisal period (e.g., ten years from the date 
the regulation will first generate costs and benefits) to compare the 
“regulate now” option with the “regulate next year” option would create a 
false impression that by delaying the regulation one year, one could 
typically
66
 increase its net benefits under differential discounting. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
66  But not “always.” The principal object of this Part has been to demonstrate that the 
“perpetual delay” phenomenon observed by Keeler and Cretin absolutely disappears when 
one assumes (contrary to Keeler and Cretin) that a year of regulatory delay means one 
fewer year the regulation will generate regulatory costs and benefits. However, it is also 
worth addressing John Graham’s very broad claim that, due to the operation of the Keeler-
Cretin paradox, discounting benefits at a lower rate than costs would “always” point 
decision makers toward perpetual delay of cost-beneficial regulations, as—even if all 
relevant Keeler-Cretin assumptions are accepted—Graham has overstated the case. If we 
apply all the relevant Keeler-Cretin assumptions to CBA (Keeler and Cretin worked in 
cost-effectiveness analysis), and we assume a fixed-length program with exactly n years of 
costs and benefits, and    is the annual discount rate for benefits, and    is the annual 
discount rate for costs, then:  
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where B0 and C0 are the costs and benefits this year, and B1 and C1 are the costs and 
benefits next year, and so on. If we assume, like Keeler and Cretin, that delaying the 
program a year will result in exactly the same annual costs and benefits, each delayed 
exactly one year, then: 
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Running regulations with various cost and benefit profiles (rising, falling, static) through 
these equations, one finds that in cost-benefit analysis (as with cost-effectiveness analysis), 
when benefits are discounted at a lower rate than costs, delaying the program does not 
“always” increase the program’s present value, even when all Keeler-Cretin assumptions 
are accepted. (Programs with falling benefits and/or programs with rising costs are 
particularly likely to become less valuable under differential discounting if they are 
delayed a year, under the Keeler and Cretin assumptions.) While the number of regulations 
for which differential discounting would not point to perpetual delay, under Keeler and 
Cretin’s highly unrealistic assumptions, may be quite small, that some regulations are 
theoretically immune does at least contradict Graham’s broad claim that, due to the 
operation of the Keeler-Cretin paradox, if costs are discounted at a lower rate than 
benefits, a program will “always” appear more cost-beneficial if it is delayed. See also 
Gravelle & Smith, supra note 46, at 592–93 (Gravelle and Smith assume a single period 
project that will be undertaken once only (note that Keeler and Cretin do not specify a 
“single period” project, although they do assume a project that will last a finite period of 
time), and that the costs and health effects are the same no matter when the project is 
undertaken; their analysis shows there are some circumstances, under these assumptions, 
when CBA with differential discounting will not point to a delay).  
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Generally, a regulation establishes a continuous policy or program, and the 
date when the regulation will stop generating costs and benefits is not 
determined by the effective date of the regulation. Thus, when using CBA 
to compare net benefits for different effective dates for the same regulation, 
it is inaccurate and misleading to assume that delaying the regulation will 
affect neither its undiscounted benefits nor its undiscounted costs. This 
assumption—necessary to obtain Keeler and Cretin’s paradoxical result—
that delaying a beneficial regulation will postpone but not otherwise 
diminish its benefits and costs, is far less likely, at least in the context of 
agency cost-benefit analysis, than the assumption that delaying the rule a 
year will mean one fewer year that the regulation will be in effect. 
 Note that if the regulation were expected to generate costs and benefits 
indefinitely, then to capture all, or almost all, of the effects of the 
regulation, the cost-benefit analysis using the 1.5% discount rate for 
benefits would have to extend for many additional years. Over an infinite 
time horizon, net benefits of the rule will approach $76.55 million if it goes 
into effect in 2011 and will approach $76.19 million if it goes into effect in 
2012. Table 1, which uses a 0% rate for benefits, obviously does not 
capture most of the effects of the ongoing, lifesaving regulation, and 
extending the analysis for additional years would not help, since the value 
of the uncaptured benefits will always be infinitely large, unless an 
estimated date is identified when the regulation will stop generating 
benefits. 
 But the purpose of this part is not to defend the use of a 0% rate for 
benefits.
67
 While there is a strong case to be made that any discounting of 
public health and environmental goods in a conventional cost-benefit 
analysis is inappropriate and unethical, these arguments are generally 
bound up with the (also strong) case against using conventional cost-benefit 
analysis as a decision-making tool at all.
68
 Instead, the principal aim of this 
part has been to establish that fear of running afoul of the “Keeler-Cretin 
paradox” is not a valid reason for OMB to prohibit or discourage 




                                                                                                                                                                          
67  Note, however, that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about arguing the 
monetized values of some resources are increasing such that a negative discount rate 
would be needed to accurately project the value of the resource into the future. A good 
example of this might be an unpolluted aquifer, if water pollution is expected to increase 
and unpolluted water is expected to become significantly scarcer. If CBA cannot 
adequately assess regulations that protect resources whose value is expected to increase 
very dramatically over time, this would seem to be an indictment of CBA, and not an 
indictment of the use of negative (or zero) discount rates.  
68  See Joseph H. Guth, Resolving the Paradoxes of Discounting in Environmental 
Decisions, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (2009). 
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 D. THE TIME-INCONSISTENCY PARADOX 
 Another common argument against using a lower discount rate for 
health benefits is the so-called “time-inconsistency paradox”—i.e., 
differential discounting would violate the assumption that, over time, the 
“optimal tradeoff between wealth and health” will remain constant.69 But 
since, as discussed below, the monetized values of health benefits are 
expected to grow over time, and the public is expected to become willing to 
expend more units of “wealth” for the same units of “health,” the 
assumption is wrong anyway, and abandoning it will lead to more accurate 
analyses than wrongly assuming static monetized values for health benefits.   
 
II. OPPORTUNITY COST RATIONALES FOR EQUAL DISCOUNTING 
 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood…70 
 
If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.
71  
 
 The concept of “opportunity cost” recognizes that with every human 
decision comes an often-hidden cost, the loss of the opportunity to take 
another (possibly better) course of action. For example, imagine I have 
$10,000 available to invest for exactly one year (at which point I will need 
to put the money toward a down payment on a house). I may be 
considering investing in a mutual fund I expect will appreciate at an annual 
rate of 6%. Another option might be a CD with a 3% annual interest rate. 
Assume—for the sake of simplicity—these are the only investment options 
available to me, besides the option of not investing. In this case, the 
opportunity cost of investing in the CD is $600 (the money I could have 
earned investing in the mutual fund, the next-best option), while the 
opportunity cost of investing in the mutual fund is $300 (the money I could 
have earned investing in the CD). A choice to invest in the CD would 
certainly seem like a bad decision, since I can expect to earn twice as much 
by investing in the mutual fund. More formally, the opportunity cost of 
investing in the CD ($600) exceeds the benefit of investing in the CD 
($300), and so, a decision to invest in the CD seems, prima facie, irrational. 
 But what if something constrains me from making the optimal 
investment? What if, for some reason, I cannot buy the mutual fund 
(although, perhaps, others still can)? Should I still refrain from buying the 
CD? Is the “opportunity cost” of buying the CD still $600, or $300 more 
than I will earn with the CD? Should I leave my money under my mattress 
if I cannot buy the mutual fund, under the economic theory that one should 
                                                                                                                                                                          
69  Graham, supra note 27, at 504–05. 
70  Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in ROBERT FROST’S POEMS 219 (Louis 
Untermeyer ed., 2002) (1915). 
71  RUSH, FREEWILL (Mercury Records 1980) (lyrics by Neil Peart). 
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not take any action for which the opportunity cost exceeds the expected 
benefits? 
 The answer, of course, is that I should buy the CD. The value of some 
better investment outcome not actually available for the decision maker to 
choose is, as a definitional matter, not an opportunity cost. If I can’t buy the 
mutual fund, I am still better off earning $300 with the CD than I would be 
leaving the money under my mattress. 
 Note that the choice of doing nothing carries with it an opportunity cost 
as well. The opportunity cost of leaving the money under my mattress is 
$600 (if the mutual fund option is available to me) or $300 (if it is not), 
while the benefit of not investing is $0. In other words, under either 
scenario, taking no action appears to be an irrational choice, because the 
benefits ($0) will be less than the opportunity cost ($600 or $300). Under 
either scenario, taking no action is the worst option. 
 A failure to apprehend these simple concepts—that the relevant 
opportunity cost is the expected value of the next-best alternative the 
decision maker can actually elect (or rationally expects to occur if she fails 
to make an election), and that “holding out” for a theoretically better but 
actually unavailable option carries with it an opportunity cost of its own—
lies at the heart of the opportunity cost arguments for equal discounting. 
 Some definitions of opportunity cost are explicit on the point that the 
opportunity cost of any course of action is the next-best option a decision 
maker could have chosen.
72
 While other definitions are not explicit on this 
point (the following definition is typical: “Opportunity cost is the value of 
the best alternative foregone in making any choice”73), it is implicit that the 
relevant next-best alternative to a given choice must be another alternative 
that the decision maker actually has the ability to select. Otherwise, and if 
the opportunity cost of agency action or inaction were assessed without 
regard for which outcomes the relevant agency can actually effectuate with 
its choice, the concept would be completely rootless.
74
 
 Misunderstanding the “opportunity cost” of regulatory actions in this 
way, without reference to the set of outcomes actually available for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
72  See, e.g., THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, VOL. 3, 719 (John 
Eatwell et al., eds. 1987); see also Minn. Power and Light v. Hockett, 105 F. Supp. 2d 
939, 943 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that, to demonstrate eligibility to recover economic 
opportunity costs from a plaintiff who obtained a preliminary injunction that was later 
overturned, the defendant “must show that the preliminary injunction prohibited him from 
engaging in profitable activities” that his existing contracts with others permitted, and “in 
which he desired and had the wherewithal to engage.”).  
73
  TIMOTHY TREGARTHEN & LIBBY RITTENBERG, MICROECONOMICS 5 (2000); see also 
City of Los Angeles v. U.S. Dep’t of Trans., 165 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir 1999) (quoting PAUL 
A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 128 (16th ed. 1998) (“A leading 
economics text defines ‘opportunity cost’ in this way: ‘Making a choice in effect costs us 
the opportunity to do something else. The alternative forgone is called the opportunity 
cost. . . .’”)). 
74  See EATWELL ET AL., supra note 72, at 718–20. 
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agency decision maker to effectuate, makes it worse than useless as a 
decision criterion. When the best action actually available is worse than the 
best action theoretically available under unrealistic assumptions,
75
 agencies 
may often be taking no action when they should be regulating to protect 
public health and/or the environment. 
 Although the opportunity costs of any alternative investments actually 
displaced by regulations are relevant considerations for regulators, the 
arguments, premised in opportunity cost, that logic compels equal 
discounting of regulatory costs and benefits, are incorrect. And, while 
opportunity costs (including investment gains foregone) are economic 
costs, using them as CBA cost inputs will often confound those analyses, 
and—by essentially raising the baseline—prevent CBAs from measuring 
what they are meant to measure. (Note that I am not arguing for or against 
applying a discount rate derived from the “opportunity cost of capital” to 
regulatory costs; that issue is analytically distinct from the issue of whether 
the economic concept of opportunity cost logically requires equal 
discounting of costs and benefits in CBAs.) 
 
 A. A RESPONSE TO OMB’S OPPORTUNITY COST ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL 
DISCOUNTING 
 The OMB Guidelines provide: “It is true that lives saved today cannot 
be invested in a bank to save more lives in the future. But the resources that 
would have been used to save those lives can be invested to earn a higher 
payoff in future lives saved.”76 Opportunity cost is not just used as a 
rationale for some discounting of health and environmental benefits; it is 
the primary positive rationale for equal discounting: 
Investment theory states that any immediate cost represents a foregone 
investment opportunity. If the immediate cost is deferred, the resulting 
savings can be invested at a positive rate of return that is defined by the 
expected inflation-adjusted (“real”) rate of interest in the economy. (The 
inflation-adjusted rate of interest is also the real discount rate used by 
analysts when transforming a future cost or benefit into present value).
77 
 According to the OMB Guidelines, should a regulator choose not to 
regulate, whatever would have been spent on the regulation could instead 
be “invested to earn a higher payoff in future lives saved.”78 All the 
regulation’s social costs represent “foregone investment opportunities.” 
But, again, at the heart of this argument lies a fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                          
75  Cf. A.K. Sen, Shadow Prices and Markets: Feasibility Constraints, in RICHARD 
LAYARD & STEPHEN GLAISTER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 102 (2nd ed. 1994) (“For a 
project evaluator . . . it is important to know which variables are within his control and to 
what extent, and in this respect a feeling of oneness with the totality of the government 
may not be very useful.”). 
76  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34. 
77  Graham et al., supra note 28, at 990 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
78  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34. 
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misunderstanding of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of an agency 
action or inaction is the value of the next-best alternative that will actually 
be foregone due to the agency’s action or inaction. 
 While the set of foregone alternatives for an agency economist to 
consider does include the “do nothing” option, of course,79 it does not—as 
many commentators have pointed out—include the option of taking the 
money that would have been spent on regulatory compliance and investing 
it on the public’s behalf.80 And even if such an option were available to the 
agency, this still would not justify equal discounting, since (as is explained 
below), for many regulations the amount by which the benefits figure is 
reduced in the CBA to account for the “opportunity cost” of foregone 
investment is actually greater than the amount that would be gained if all 
regulatory costs were invested at the discount rate. Since public health and 
environmental regulations are generally directed at market failures,
81
 large 
jumps in social welfare as a consequence of regulation should not confound 
the analysis in this way. 
 The opportunity cost argument for equal discounting also errs in its 
assumption that the value of the “next best” alternative should always be 
included as a cost input in CBA (if fully operationalized, this policy would 
result in some enormously beneficial regulations being assessed as having 
“net benefits” of only a penny), and it errs in assuming that, by using CBA 
to make decisions, one could maximize two distinct variables at once.  
 
1. Analysts conducting CBAs cannot simultaneously maximize both 
“net benefits” and the total number of lives saved 
 In making the case for equal discounting, the OMB Guidelines make 
two claims that are fundamentally incompatible, and that are each 
individually incorrect. The first claim is that equal discounting in CBAs 
will result in more lifesaving. The second is that equal discounting in CBAs 
will increase social welfare.
82
  
 The two claims are incompatible with each other, as “it is not 
mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the 
same time.”83 We cannot make a decision that maximizes “net benefits” (as 
calculated in a CBA), whilst simultaneously maximizing a different and 
distinct variable, the total number of lives saved in society.   
 It is easy to see how CBA’s promoters were drawn to arguments that 
CBA (including the controversial equal discounting requirement) will 
maximize not just “net benefits,” but also “lifesaving” (for, if so, CBA’s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
79
  Unless the agency is constrained by a statute or court order. 
80  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 9, at 34–35; Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 
YALE LAW J. 1911, 1912 n. 4 (1999). 
81  See infra note 100. 
82  Or one of its economic proxies, “net benefits” or “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.” See 
discussion infra Part I.A.3.a.  
83  Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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detractors are making utterly perverse policy arguments—they wish to save 
fewer lives and reduce net social welfare, all, apparently, for the sake of 
clinging to irrational, absolutist values). But the claim that equal 
discounting in CBA will enable regulators to both maximize some 
economic measure of welfare and maximize the total number of lives saved 
defies logic. In fact, this application of equal discounting will not maximize 
either variable.  
2. The claim that equal discounting will maximize the total number 
of lives saved fails 
 The “lifesaving” argument may be attempting to persuade a readership 
that includes CBA skeptics who would find arguments that reduce to 
“equal discounting will maximize social welfare” unpersuasive. (To some, 
a decision that maximizes social welfare may be less attractive than a 
decision that doesn’t, if, for example, most of the social welfare gains 
would inure to the benefit of healthy billionaires, and if some vulnerable 
people would experience welfare losses.)  
 It might make sense in the abstract to say that, instead of spending 
resources on a certain regulation, society as a collective unit could choose 
instead to invest those resources in mutual funds and buy more "lifesaving 
benefits" later. However, when we are talking about an actual agency 
decision-maker (and, in the case of any policy reviewed by OIRA, we 
always are), in general, the “next best” alternative to regulating is leaving 
the funds that would have been spent on compliance in the control of 
regulated industry and any other regulatory payors. Agencies are not 
empowered to tax, and neither may they direct the regulatory payors to take 
the money that would otherwise have been spent on the regulation and 
invest it for future lifesaving.
84
 If there is no actual “opportunity” for the 
agency to cause the projected compliance costs to be invested in alternative 
future lifesaving, then this is not truly an “opportunity cost” of a decision to 
regulate.  
 In general, the biggest regulatory payors are actors that seek to 
maximize profits. A firm that doesn’t have to buy a better scrubber for its 
smokestack is not going to invest the money it would have spent on the 
scrubber in a special account for future lifesaving. If agencies are unable to 
compel this behavior, and if a rational firm would not make this investment 
on its own, then to say an agency must determine before regulating whether 
one could theoretically save more lives in the future by investing the 
projected regulatory costs at current rates of return on investments is 
ridiculous. The agency simply lacks the power—by regulating or by 
forbearing to regulate—to cause this investment to occur, or to even make 
it more likely to occur.
85
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
84  Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1912. 
85  See id. 
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3. The claim that the across-the-board equal discounting mandate 
serves to increase social welfare (or its proxy, “net benefits”) also 
fails 
a. The projected investment gains of the next-best alternative to 
a regulation is not necessarily an appropriate CBA cost input  
 Opportunity costs (assuming they do represent actual forgone 
opportunities) are real economic costs, to be sure. However, some 
opportunity costs should not be used as cost inputs in CBAs. Understanding 
why requires some understanding of the theory that underlies cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 At its most ambitious and theoretical, costs-benefit analysis attempts to 
maximize total social welfare. It has its roots in the work of Wilfred Pareto, 
who postulated that “[a]n economic change is desirable if in the new 
situation at least one individual is better off and no individual is worse 
off.”86 Such an economic change is referred to as a “Pareto improvement.”  
 Building on Pareto’s work, economists like Nicholas Kaldor and John 
Hicks theorized that a policy could be socially beneficial—more 
“efficient,” even—if it has the effect of making one set of people better off 
and another set worse off, so long as the winners could theoretically 
compensate the losers; this type of change is sometimes referred to as a 
“potential Pareto improvement.”87 
 Cost-benefit analysis effectuates the Kaldor-Hicks principle that such 
potential Pareto improvements are social “benefits” regardless of who wins 
and who loses. If the sum of everyone’s individual utilities before the 
change is less than the sum of everyone’s individual utilities after the 
change, the change will be said to have had a net social benefit. Everyone’s 
utilities are given equal weight. The best choice, under CBA, is the one that 
maximizes net benefits. 
 In its most sophisticated form, a CBA of a regulatory proposal 
accurately estimates expected changes in “consumer surplus”88 and 
“producer surplus”89 for various effective dates and levels of regulatory 
stringency, carefully identifies and quantifies any likely changes in 
government revenue, and perhaps uses distributional weights to value 
certain goods more (or less), depending on whether or not they are received 
                                                                                                                                                                          
86  CAROLINE DINWIDDY & FRANCIS TEAL, PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 60 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). 
87  Id. at 66–67. 
88  Consumer surplus means “the accumulated difference between the market price and 
the price consumers would, at a maximum, have accepted to pay for the products 
purchased.” MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 87 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2003).  
89  “Producer surplus” refers to the excess amount “producers receive above and beyond 
the minimum prices that would have been required to get them to produce and sell their 
output.” EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS 325 (W.W. Norton & Co., 
11th ed. 2003). 
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or spent by populations who derive more (or less) utility from the relevant 
goods. The analyst ultimately arrives at a policy that maximizes social 
welfare (or “net benefits” or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency—all of these terms 
are used to mean essentially the same thing, in the CBA context.) But these 
very sophisticated, complete CBAs tend to reside mostly, if not entirely, in 
textbooks.  
 As Table 3, below, illustrates, real-world agency CBAs bear little 
resemblance to what one might expect from studying high-theory welfare 
economics textbooks. Once completed, even a comparatively sophisticated 
real-world analysis that cost an agency tens of thousands of dollars will 
ultimately generate (in addition to certain narrative and cost-effectiveness 
information) “bottom line” summaries like the following, which estimates 
net benefits for EPA’s favored proposed rule on new source performance 
standards and emissions guidelines for sewage sludge incineration units.
90
   
 Even though not all benefits in Table 3 are monetized and included in 
the “net benefits” figure; even though the analysis does not purport to 
capture costs and benefits over the whole lifespan of the regulation; even 
though this analysis is undoubtedly flawed, still, there is no doubt that it is 
attempting to measure the change in societal benefits that will result from 
the regulation.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
90  The final regulation that was ultimately issued by EPA is similar, but not identical to, 
the proposal considered in the analysis summarized in Table 3. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines for 
Existing Sources: Sewage Sludge Incineration Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 15372, 15380–82 
(March 21, 2011). 
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Table 3: Summary of Estimated Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits for the 

























Net Benefits for the Year 2015 $37 - $220 $26 - $190 
Additional environmental benefits not 
monetized and not accounted for in the “net 
benefits” figures:  
 
26,000 tons of carbon monoxide 
96 tons of HCl 
5,500 pounds of mercury 
1.6 tons of cadmium 
3.0 tons of lead 
90 grams of dioxins/furans 
Health effects from reduced NO2 and SO2 
exposure  
 
   
 Assume, now, that the EPA has extremely wide discretion regarding 
precise effective dates and levels of stringency. In that case, even if the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
91  This table is adapted from RTI INT’L, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: STANDARDS 
OF PERFORMANCE FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES AND EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR 
EXISTING SOURCES: SEWAGE SLUDGE INCINERATION UNITS 1–3 (September 2010) 
(Prepared for EPA). (Similar charts were presented for two additional regulatory 
alternatives. Id.) The RIA is available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDe 
tail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0559-0042. 
92  Note that this figure includes a small amount of “disbenefits,” i.e., health costs that 
will result from the extra fuel consumption necessitated by the rule. Id. at 1–3. If 
differential discounting were operationalized, this type of accounting is a way agencies 
might apply the same discount rate to health benefits as to health costs.  
93  The regulatory impact analysis presents this data as the rule’s “total social costs,” but 
immediately clarifies that: “The annual compliances [sic] costs serve as a proxy for the 
annual social costs of this rule given the lack of difference between the two.” Id. (The 
negative health effects of the regulation are accounted for in the benefits figure, as 
“disbenefits.”)  
94
  “Annualized” compliance costs were estimated to be $92M in 2008 dollars for the 
year 2015 (compliance costs appear to have been annualized over a period of fifteen years, 
so the costs for 2015 will include capital costs incurred earlier). See id. at 3-5 and C-33. 
Earlier in the analysis, it is explained that “Costs are on a 2008 basis, and annualized costs 
assumed an interest rate of 7 percent.” Id. at 3-3. It is interesting that the EPA appears here 
to have engaged in a form of differential discounting when it subtracted annualized costs, 
discounted at 7%, from benefits discounted at 3%.  
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agency chooses the most cost-beneficial regulation possible, the “next-best 
alternative” to that regulation might be a regulation that is almost exactly as 
cost-beneficial as the option that was selected. The “next-best” alternative 
might have net benefits that are only a penny less than the alternative with 
the highest net benefits.   
 But this “opportunity cost” baseline is obviously the wrong baseline for 
cost-benefit analysis. If a rule generates a billion dollars in net benefits 
when compared to the status quo, pre-regulation world, then we wouldn’t 
say that the net benefits of the rule are $0.01, even if an alternative version 
of the regulation that was also available to the agency would have 
generated only a penny less in net benefits (or would have had a rate of 
return that was, say, less than a billionth of a percentage point lower). 
 The command not to take an action for which the opportunity costs are 
greater than the expected benefits, and the command to maximize net 
benefits will—if we are monetizing and discounting goods the same way 
for both analyses—generate the same outcome. However, using 
“opportunity costs” (such as forgone alternative rates of return on 
“regulatory investment”) as cost inputs in a CBA may prevent the CBA 
from measuring what it purports to measure. Instead of measuring net 
benefits from a “status quo” baseline (or some other plausible baseline), the 
analysis will measure net benefits from a “next best alternative” baseline. 
This will make it impossible for policy makers to compare projects using 
CBA: does a project with “net benefits” of a penny reflect an investment of 
resources with a low rate of return, or does that low “net benefits” figure 
merely reflect a high degree of rulemaking flexibility for the agency? 
b. Even accepting the OMB Guidelines’ assumption that but for 
the regulation all regulatory costs would be invested at a rate 
equal to the discount rate, discounting all a regulation’s benefits 
at the discount rate would still irrationally lower the net benefits 
of cost-beneficial regulations 
 While there is, of course, an economic value associated with leaving the 
money that would have been spent on regulation in the hands of regulated 
industry (and in the hands of any others who would bear regulatory costs), 
this is not a value that necessarily grows at some universal “expected 
inflation-adjusted…rate of interest in the economy.”95  
 One might argue, for example, that even though a firm’s foregone 
compliance costs will not be invested on the public’s behalf, this money 
might be invested on the firm’s behalf, and the loss of that investment gain 
to the firm should be considered an opportunity cost of regulating (after all, 
we are attempting with CBA to quantify all the costs and benefits that 
accrue to all segments of society as a result of regulation). But the act of 
forbearing to regulate will not cause an affected firm to invest all the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
95  Graham et al., supra note 28, at 990. 
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foregone compliance costs on its own behalf, either, and any other 
regulatory payors (for example, any negatively-affected employees or 
customers) will not invest all of the regulatory costs foregone. Instead, 
some of this money will simply be consumed, and not invested,
96
 and the 
amount of actual averted investment (and the relevant rates of return) will 
vary greatly across regulations. 
 One of the discount rates agencies must use in their cost-benefit 
analyses is 7%.
97
 (This is a “real” rate, meaning this rate is applied after 
adjusting for inflation. Thus, if the annual rate of inflation is 2%, the 
corresponding “nominal” discount rate—the discount rate that also adjusts 
for inflation—is 9%.) Agencies applying the 7% real discount rate to 
benefits under this opportunity cost theory assume that, in the absence of 
regulation, the inflation-adjusted annual growth in value of the avoided 
compliance costs would be 7%. It is incorrect, however, to assume that the 
regulatory payors would invest the avoided compliance costs such that this 
money would experience growth at this rate. If 7% is the firm’s return on 
investment after adjusting for inflation, then achieving 7% annual growth 
in the value of all the avoided compliance costs would require 100% 
reinvestment by the firm, with zero consumption during the lifespan of the 
proposed regulation. This is simply not a plausible assumption.
98
 
  For regulations for which the costs, invested at the discount rate, would 
not grow enough to exceed the expected benefits by the time the benefits 
are to be realized (that is, for any regulation that passes CBA under equal 
discounting), the problem is compounded. If all the foregone costs are 
unlikely to be invested, it is still less likely that a larger sum of money—
i.e, the amount that would have to be invested at the discount rate in order 
for the value of the investment to equal the value of the regulatory benefits 
at the times they would have occurred—would be invested as a direct result 
of a regulator’s decision not to regulate. 
 Returning to the smokestack example, assume the purpose of this 
proposed pollution reduction measure is to internalize an externality. This 
means the regulation will both reduce pollution and increase the firm’s 
production costs, so that more of the public costs (or, the “negative 
externalities”) of the firm’s activities will be absorbed (or, “internalized”) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
96  See Shane Frederick, Valuing Future Life and Future Lives: A Framework for 
Understanding Discounting, 27 J. OF ECON. PSYCH. 667, 671 (2006). 
97
 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34. The other 
rate is 3%. Id. 
98  Frederick, supra note 96, at 671. If the OMB’s 3% discount rate is premised in 
opportunity cost, but is meant to reflect a partial investment at a higher rate of return, then 
this should be made explicit. The 7% rate (the other rate called for by the OMB 
guidelines), if it is premised in opportunity cost, cannot reflect much—if any—expected 
short-term consumption. 
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by the firm. Precisely because the firm is now bearing more of the costs of 
its pollution, it can be expected to pollute at more efficient levels.
99
  
 A decision not to regulate may provide measurable economic benefit to 
the polluting firm, its investors, and perhaps to its customers and 
employees; however, because the firm is engaging in activity (polluting) 
that causes a deadweight loss
100
 to society (as uninternalized negative 
externalities always do),
101
 these benefits come as part of a package that, on 
balance, likely reduces social welfare, the loss of which cannot necessarily 
be made up for by merely investing some sum of money that will be 
expected to grow at the discount rate. 
 To take a stark example, imagine that an agency is considering a 
regulation with an immediate cost of $100 (and no other costs), which 
would produce health benefits in 20 years that will have a monetized value 
of approximately $100,000 (in constant 2011 dollars) at that time. If that 
initial $100 were immediately invested at a 7% interest rate, it would still 
be worth less than $400 after 20 years. It makes no sense to say that the 
present value of that $100,000 in regulatory benefits is only $62,000 
because, instead of funding the regulation, the initial $100 in costs could 
have been invested at market rates of return!
102
 
 A key distinction between agency decisions and most private, financial 
investment decisions is that regulators don’t necessarily have a panoply of 
options before them that is analogous to the selection that a private investor 
would likely enjoy. Among real agency alternatives, there may be no 
option that saves just one life more or fewer. Hypothetically, if OSHA were 
determining whether workers on low, 10-foot to15-foot aerial lifts should 
be required to wear full-body harnesses, there would most likely be a 
certain amount of discretion left to the agency; however, the agency must 
make some “investment” decisions for which there are no gradations at the 
margins. In the world of finance, it is generally possible to make gradated 
investment decisions. However, regulatory agencies may have to make 
binary, yes/no decisions that have large economic consequences. For 
                                                                                                                                                                          
99  RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 527–33 
(2004).  
100  In economics, “deadweight loss” is a social cost incurred when the market 
equilibrium, which sets the price of a commodity, does not reflect the socially optimum 
price point. See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 89, at 330. This may occur when market 
failures, such as negative externalities and monopolies, affect the market equilibrium. See 
id.; see also FAURE & SKOGH, supra note 88, at 94–98.  
101  See JUST ET AL., supra note 99, at 529. 
102
  Of course, if the benefits to be received in 20 years would have taken the form of 
actual money, and not health benefits, and if 7% is the correct discount rate for that 
money—if the recipient would be indifferent between receiving $62,000 now and 
$100,000 in 20 years—then those benefits may indeed be worth only $62,000 today. But 
the time value of the ultimate monetary benefit to its beneficiary has absolutely nothing to 
do with the value of the next-best regulation (or other investment) that was foregone when 
this regulation with $100 in social costs was chosen by the regulator.  
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practical or legal reasons, there may be a very large difference between the 
net benefits of a proposed regulation and the net benefits of its next-best 
available alternative. 
 The decision to discount all regulatory benefits at the rate of return 
foregone for regulatory costs seems to assume: (1) that there is likely an 
alternative investment for those costs that would have a rate of return 
approximately the same as the rate of return of the regulatory option being 
evaluated; and (2) that those opportunity costs are cost inputs that should be 
included in the CBA. Neither assumption is necessarily correct. 
 
B. A RESPONSE TO THE SUNSTEIN/ROWELL ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL 
DISCOUNTING 
 In an interesting paper that defends the OMB’s equal discounting 
requirement, Sunstein and Rowell acknowledge that the OMB Guidelines’ 
“brisk” reference to opportunity costs might not provide a sufficient basis 
for equal discounting.
103
 (They also acknowledge that, in the future, we 
may be willing to pay more to save lives, and so the “value of a statistical 
life” may be growing over time—see discussion infra Part III.B.) Sunstein 
and Rowell attempt to separate the issue of discounting’s logic from the 
issue of discounting’s ethics, and argue that logic compels that monetized 
health benefits be discounted. The resulting ethical problem (how to ensure 
that the present strikes the right balance between protecting its interests and 
protecting the interests of the future, when discounting can so dramatically 
lower the apparent value of current regulations whose benefits accrue to the 
future) must therefore be addressed through some method other than 
refusing to apply the “appropriate discount rate for money”104 to health and 
environmental goods. 
 According to Sunstein and Rowell: 
If the issue is how much people now living will be willing to pay in 
twenty years to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, the resulting amount must 
be subject to the appropriate discount rate for money—and hence a VSL 
[value of a statistical life] of $10 million, if that is the appropriate amount 
in twenty years, must be discounted too. The reason has nothing to do 
with discounting life or health; it is that a sum of money in the future is 
worth less than the same sum today. Recall that any particular dollar 
amount in twenty years is worth some fraction of that figure now not for 
any exotic or theoretically contentious reason, but because the fraction can 
be invested and made to grow.
105 
 Sunstein and Rowell argue that it is not lives per se that are being 
discounted. Instead, they argue, we are only ever discounting dollars. If the 
life being saved in twenty years will have a monetized value of $10 million 
at that time, then the present value of saving that life is $5.54 million (at a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
103  See Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 177, 181. 
104  Id. at 186. 
105  Id. 
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3% discount rate) or $2.58 million (at a 7% rate), because that’s how much 
a guarantee of $10 million of actual money in twenty years is worth now. 
“So long as valuations are based on private willingness to pay, there is no 
special problem with discounting money; any objection is to the use of 
willingness to pay, not to discounting as such.”106  
1. There is no single discount rate that inheres in money, qua 
money; costs and benefits can easily be expressed in the same units 
and then discounted at different rates 
 There exists no “appropriate discount rate for money,” qua money; 
there is no single discount rate that inheres in all units of this good, even at 
a single point in time in a single economy. For example, outside of the 
CBA context, OMB has explained:  
Some Federal activities provide a mix of both Federal cost savings and 
external social benefits. For example, Federal investments in information 
technology can produce Federal savings in the form of lower 
administrative costs and external social benefits in the form of faster 
claims processing. The net present value of such investments should be 
evaluated with the 7 percent real discount rate[…]unless the analysis is 
able to allocate the investment's costs between provision of Federal cost 
savings and external social benefits. Where such an allocation is possible, 
Federal cost savings and their associated investment costs may be 
discounted at the Treasury rate, while the external social benefits and their 
associated investment costs should be discounted at the 7 percent real 
rate.
107 
 Even assuming that monetization of extramarket intangibles through 
willingness to pay does generate dollar figures that should be treated like 
“any other money”108 (and I argue below that it does not), as the above 
OMB quote shows, there is no one rate that is appropriate for all money. 
So, the mere monetizing of an extramarket good, in and of itself, cannot 
establish what its discount rate should be. (While the OMB Guidelines now 
demand that all goods be discounted using equal discounting at both 7% 
and 3%, with a “net benefits” figure calculated under each rate,109 this is 
not because either figure is necessarily the appropriate rate for money, qua 
money.) 
 Thus, even if every cost and benefit itemized in a CBA were an actual 
monetary cost or benefit, it still would not follow that all benefits and costs 
should presumptively be discounted at identical rates.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
106  Id. at 174. See also Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1912 (“Money is discounted 
precisely because tomorrow’s dollar is worth less than today’s. If life is equivalent to 
money, its value must also decline with time.”). 
107  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-94 (1992), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094#8. 
108 Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of 
Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1514 (2010). 
109  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 34. 
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2. CBA arguably does require monetization of goods that are 
arguably incommensurable with money; still, some special handling 
of “incommensurables” is both economically sound and ethically 
preferable to treating these goods—once monetized—exactly like 
market commodities 
 This paper focuses on CBA, but it is worth noting, as an aside, that the 
cost-effectiveness analyses that agencies submit to Sunstein’s OIRA 
directly discount the values of future lives, qua lives.
110
 Whatever justifies 
discounting of those lives, it cannot be the fact that the discounting is 
merely being done to a “sum of money,” since those lives are discounted 
directly, such that any lives that aren’t saved immediately are only worth a 
fraction of a life.  
 While it may be technically true that cost-benefit analysts apply 
discount rates to dollar amounts, and not directly to human lives (because a 
cost-benefit analyst converts the value of the life into dollars and then 
discounts the dollars), these analysts nevertheless diminish the present 
value of those lives just as surely as their counterparts who practice cost-
effectiveness analysis.  
 In CBA, unlike cost-effectiveness analysis, all costs and benefits must 
be expressed in the same units. Theoretically, this base unit can be 
anything; it does not have to be monetary.
111
 It could be apples.
112
 It could 
be salt. But the mere act of converting the original good into equivalent 
units of the base good doesn’t cause the original good to take on all the 
properties of the base good.  
 The mere act of expressing a regulation’s non-monetary benefits in 
dollar equivalents does not cause the present value of those benefits to 
diminish at a real rate of 7% per year any more than expressing a 
regulation’s benefits in equivalent units of salt would cause those benefits 
to become soluble in water. Put another way: we may know that in twenty 
years we will be willing to pay $10 million to avoid a death that year, but 
this fact alone does not tell us how much we will be willing to pay today 
(or ten years from now) to avoid that death, and learning the appropriate 
discount rate for that CBA’s cost inputs does not answer the question. To 
find the present value of the averted death, we need to know the rate at 
which our willingness-to-pay (WTP)
113
 values for this good are expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
110  Oddly, the OMB currently recommends different, lower discount rates for use in cost-
effectiveness analyses, which is used to evaluate the very same regulations evaluated with 
CBA. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-94, Appendix C (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094/a94_appx-c/. 
111  See Mark Ellington, Numeraire Illusion: The Final Demise of the Kaldor-Hicks 
Principle, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 96 (Mark D. White 
ed., 2009).  
112  Id.  
113  Or our willingness-to-accept values, if that is the correct estimation technique for that 
good in that context (see infra discussion of willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-
2011]                 THE CASE FOR DIFFERENTIAL DISCOUNTING                      117 
change over time, because we are not just discounting a sum of money, we 
are discounting the value of a particular illiquid and non-fungible good that 
does not have all the characteristics of the base good, money, and so to 
know its value at any point in time we need more information than just its 




According to Rowell: 
If economic cost-benefit analysis has a claim to usefulness, it is because it 
converts disparate goods into a single metric: money. Money can be 
invested. This is one of its fundamental qualities. The practice of 
discounting monetized benefits stems from this quality: removing that 
characteristic from the mix means that we are no longer dealing with 
money. Instead, we are comparing classic soda to diet soda—“money” to 
something like “money lite,” which has some (but not all) of the qualities 
of money.
115 
Well . . . yes. Rowell’s analysis elucidates one of the fundamental problems 
with adding monetized values of intangible goods—like saved lives—that 
cannot be invested and are not fully commensurable with money, to a cost-
benefit equation.
116
 Non-fungible health and environmental goods simply 
do not share all of money’s fundamental qualities, and this 
incommensurability is indeed a problem for the usefulness of cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 Whether the monetized values for extramarket benefits were originally 
derived through WTP or through some other method is irrelevant. Our mere 
knowledge of the present, monetized value of a health benefit that will 
occur at some specific, later point in time, along with our knowledge of the 
appropriate discount rate(s) for the other inputs in the CBA, are insufficient 
in and of themselves to tell us what the monetized value of that intangible 
health benefit will be if it is to occur at any other point in time. Frustrating 
though this may be for someone trying to produce a clean analysis, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
accept at Part III.B); however, the Sunstein & Rowell analysis assumes that all values for 
intangible, non-monetary regulatory benefits will be derived through WTP estimates, and 
that assumption is adopted here.  
114  If we are willing to spend $7 million today to avoid exposing a child to a certainly 
lethal carcinogen with a 20-year latency period, and if the willingness to pay to avoid such 
a cancer case in twenty years, right before the cancer will become apparent, will be $10 
million (controlling for inflation), we can conclude from this that the $7 million value the 
present ascribes to saving that life is greater than the present value of the future’s 
willingness to pay to save that life (because the present value using the future’s WTP is 
only $5.54 million or $2.58 million, under the 3% and 7% rates, respectively) 
(incidentally, this would create a difficulty—whose valuation should we use?). Or we can 
simply conclude that the value of this regulatory benefit does not diminish at the same rate 
as monetary benefits as the benefits are delayed. 
115  Rowell, supra note 108, at 1516. 
116  See Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques 
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996). 
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mere monetizing of these extramarket goods is insufficient to cause them to 
behave just like money. 
 Even in the context of CBAs, which arguably do demand monetization 
of all goods that are to be represented in the ultimate net benefits figure, we 
can set some limits on the extent to which we treat extramarket health and 
environmental goods as if they possess all the attributes of ordinary market 
commodities. Although I disagree with her conclusion, I find Rowell’s 
insight about “money lite” extremely helpful to my understanding of how 
monetized intangibles ought to be treated in a CBA. Even after 
monetization, they ought to be treated as uninvestible; they ought to be 
treated as “money lite.” 
 Given the way CBAs are already calculated, differential discounting 
should be relatively easy to operationalize in many analyses. Real-world 
CBAs generally list a limited set of monetized costs and benefits—which 
are already itemized and discounted separately from one another—and 
subtract the discounted costs from the discounted benefits to arrive at a net 
benefits figure. (Economists and students of public policy who are 




3. Even if all benefits were investible, this would not justify an equal 
discounting requirement 
 Assuming, arguendo, that all CBA inputs derived through WTP 
estimations should be treated as investible, under the theory that 
investability is an intrinsic characteristic of money, this fact alone would 
not justify an across-the-board equal discounting mandate.  
 Sunstein and Rowell claim that once the values of lives saved are 
monetized, they must be discounted because “a sum of money in the future 
is worth less than the same sum today. Recall that any particular dollar 
amount in twenty years is worth some fraction of that figure now not for 
any exotic or theoretically contentious reason, but because the fraction can 
be invested and made to grow.”118 This is the language of opportunity cost, 
and this claim is similar to the standard opportunity cost argument 
discussed in Part II.A., above. But while the OMB Guidelines justify equal 
discounting based on the theoretical investability of all the regulatory costs, 
Sunstein and Rowell seem to justify equal discounting based on the 
theoretical investability of the benefits. But even if both costs and benefits 
                                                                                                                                                                          
117
  Much of this may be a result of the difficulty of obtaining the data needed for a 
complete accounting of regulatory costs and benefits. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (stating that in the context of 
hazardous air pollutants, “we find it unthinkable that science may ever yield absolute 
certainty of safety in an area so complicated and replete with problems of measurement, 
modeling, long latency, and the like[.]”). 
118  Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 186. 
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were investible, they might not both be investible at precisely the same 
rates of return, and so equal discount rates may not appropriate.  
 Assuming the regulatory benefits in question are investible—assuming, 
even, that they will take the form of actual money—that fact alone cannot 
establish that identical discount rates must apply to the costs and the 
benefits. If the winners and the losers have very different constraints and 
very different investment opportunities, they might reveal very different 
present values for identical guarantees of future money. While it might be 
convenient to assign equal rates to all monetary sums that enter a CBA, this 
policy is in no sense compelled by logic. 
 
C. AN “OPPORTUNITY COST PARALYZING PARADOX,” AND WHY IT IS 
IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF DIFFERENTIAL DISCOUNTING  
 The standard opportunity cost rationale for discounting, discussed in 
Subpart A, is often combined with an assumption that the inflation-adjusted 
cost of lifesaving will never change, leading commentators to conclude that 
even when, after equal discounting, the present value of the benefits of 
regulating now are less than the present value of the costs of regulating 
now (that is, even if regulating now would be cost-beneficial under equal 
discounting), it may still make sense to delay regulation to achieve the 
maximum possible lifesaving benefit:  
While human lives are priceless from a philosophical or religious 
perspective, the resources that can be used to save lives are limited. If we 
fail to recognize this economic reality as we go about the process of 
choosing regulations, we will expend resources in a way that prevents us 
from saving as many lives as possible. It is not the idea that future lives 
are less valuable in any moral or ethical sense that leads to the process of 
discounting at a current rate of interest. Rather, discounting is appropriate 
in that, if invested, our resources are expected to grow at that rate, so that 
if we forego spending and invest the money instead, we can save more 




The central rationale for discounting future lifesaving is the opportunity 
cost of investing resources now—since lifesaving may not occur for many 
years, or possibly decades. If instead of expending $1 billion today to save 
1000 lives ten years from now, we invest the $1 billion for ten years at a 
3% real rate of interest, we will accumulate $1.34 billion to invest in 
lifesaving (or other purposes) ten years from now. If the marginal 
(inflation-adjusted) cost of saving lives is the same ten years from now as 
it is today, investing the resources will enable us to save 1340 lives ten 
years from now—340 more than we will save by making the immediate 
lifesaving expenditure.
120 
                                                                                                                                                                          
119  John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount 
Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901, 1905 (1999). 
120  Graham, supra note 27, at 504.  
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 But why stop at only 1,340 lives? If Graham is right that “we” can 
invest the resources that would have been spent on the regulation at a 3% 
real rate, and if he is correct in his assumption that the marginal, inflation-
adjusted cost of saving lives is not increasing, then (with apologies to 
Heinzerling, who has made a very similar point)
121
 we could save 19,219 
lives by waiting 100 years. We could save 2,621,877,234 lives by waiting 
500 years. Under the terms of the example above, rather than make a 
current investment of $1 million per life to be saved ten years from now 
(even at a 7% discount rate, and using the values for lives saved in current 
use at the agencies, this proposal “passes” cost-benefit analysis in the sense 
that its costs are less than its benefits, even after equal discounting), we 
should not regulate if we could theoretically save more lives in the future 
by investing our regulatory budget. However, the catch, under this set of 
assumptions, is that it may always make sense to leave that budget 
invested; under these constraints, we may never actually get around to 
saving any of those lives.
122
 (And note that while Graham, in the quote 
above, does not make it clear that the lives we are paying to save ten years 
from the present will actually be saved ten years after the money is spent, 
this is obviously true. Graham assumes that the marginal cost of lifesaving 
is static; therefore, if it takes a current expenditure of $1 million to save a 
life ten years from now, then in ten years it will cost $1 million to save a 
life twenty years from now.) 
 This version of the opportunity cost argument compounds the error of 
the opportunity cost argument discussed in Subpart A, above, by adding an 
erroneous assumption that the marginal, inflation-adjusted cost of saving 
lives is not increasing. But there is ample evidence that the marginal cost of 




 This opportunity cost-plus argument would generally prohibit current 
investments in lifesaving whenever more lives could theoretically be saved 
in the future, but two false assumptions—i.e., the cost of lifesaving grows 
at the rate of inflation, and the money to be spent on lifesaving would, in 
the absence of regulation, be invested and made to grow faster than 
                                                                                                                                                                          
121  See Heinzerling, supra note 80, at 1912. 
122  See id. 
123  Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 
122 QUART. J. OF ECON. 39, 59–60 (2007). Ben Trachtenberg, in an article that was 
published while this piece was in press, writes that “[s]ince 1980, health [care cost] 
inflation has outpaced general inflation on average by more than 3% annually.” Ben 
Trachtenberg, Health Inflation, Wealth Inflation, and the Discounting of Human Life, 89 
OR. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (2011). Trachtenberg argues that the increasing rate of health 
spending is evidence that the public’s “willingness-to-pay” for reduced mortality risks is 
rising at about the same rate. Id.  
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inflation
124—game the analysis, making it excessively difficult to justify 
regulation. 
 As a rationale for equal discounting, this variation of the opportunity 
cost argument fails completely. It attempts to justify the discounting of 
lifesaving benefits on the ground that this discounting will ultimately cause 
a larger total number of lives to be saved. Discounting is normally 
understood to reflect our understanding of how the present values of the 
goods being evaluated will actually change as the timing of the benefits 
change. But, accepting for the moment that Graham and Donohue are 
correct in their apparent understanding that lifesaving benefits should be 
discounted at whatever rate will best point analysts toward saving the 
greatest total number of lives with their regulatory budget, recall the 
assumptions they make: (1) instead of promulgating the regulation at issue, 
the agency could instead cause the regulation’s projected costs to be 
invested for future lifesaving; (2) if invested, the averted regulatory costs 
could be made to grow faster than inflation; and (3) the inflation-adjusted 
cost of lifesaving is static, and so, for example, if a present expenditure of 
$1 billion would save 1,000 lives in ten years, then we could also spend (an 
inflation-adjusted) $1 billion in 10 years to save 1,000 lives in 20 years. 
  As discussed above, these assumptions together would create a sort of 
“opportunity cost paradox” for an agency that wants to spend the investable 
regulatory budget at whatever time it would save the largest number of 
lives. Equal discounting would—under these assumptions—simply 
paralyze the agency, and thus could not result in the increased lifesaving 
that Graham and Donohue predict. 
 Even if one assumes that this problem has been dealt with, and that 
some mechanism (such as a time limit, after which any investment for 
future lifesaving must be spent) will ensure that all the investments we 
make in lieu of immediate regulation will eventually be spent to save lives, 
this rationale for equal discounting still fails. 
  Return to Graham’s example, where a decision maker can save 1,000 
lives (in ten years) by causing $1 billion to be spent today, and this 
represents the fixed marginal cost (in current dollars) of saving lives ten 
years after the date of the expenditure, and where any of that $1 billion not 
immediately spent on regulation could be invested at an inflation-adjusted 
3% annual interest rate. One finds that, when the monetized values of the 
lifesaving benefits are discounted at the same 3% rate used for costs, we are 
indifferent between buying regulatory benefits right now, and investing the 
money and buying regulatory benefits at any time in the future. 
  However, when the lifesaving benefits are discounted at a lower rate 
than monetary costs, the value of the lives to be saved in the future exceeds 
the value of the (smaller number of) lives that would be saved if the 
expenditure were made today. The closer the discount rate for benefits gets 
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to zero, the more strongly we would prefer later regulatory expenditures, 
which would save more lives. 
  It is important to remember that none of this is relevant to the question 
of whether differential discounting is correct in the real world, where at 
least two of Graham and Donohue’s key assumptions do not hold. The 
point here is that even if all of Graham and Donohue’s assumptions were 
correct, this “opportunity cost-plus” argument would still fail to justify a 
preference for equal discounting over differential discounting. 
 
III. VALUING FUTURE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 
Once the discount rate for health and environmental goods is untethered 
from the discount rate for money; once neither the concept of opportunity 
cost nor any perceived “paradoxes” are understood to compel equal 
discounting; and once these discount rates can, therefore, be independently 
derived, the question becomes: what should the discount rate for health and 
environmental benefits be? Identifying the precise rate(s) that should be 
used for these goods is beyond the scope of this paper.
125
 However, the 
purpose of this section is to establish that, as the time when these benefits 
will be enjoyed becomes more distant, the present value of these benefits 
generally declines, if at all, much more slowly than the present value of a 
monetary benefit would. Therefore the discount rate for health and 
environmental goods should be significantly lower than the rate for money. 
 While the OMB and some law review authors have claimed that there is 
a “professional” or “technical” “consensus” in favor of equal discounting in 
cost-benefit analysis,
126
 there exists a spirited cost-effectiveness analysis 
literature that makes the case for differential discounting. While some of 
that analysis admittedly cannot be directly applied to cost-benefit analysis, 
the arguments made in that literature that health benefits—unlike money—
are becoming more valuable over time have clear applicability to CBA. 
 Subpart A makes the case that health and environmental goods do not 
behave like most other goods (including money), in that we do not 
necessarily value additional units of these goods less as we acquire more of 
them, and explains why this implies that money should be discounted at a 
higher rate than these goods. Subpart B discusses the evidence that the 
dollar values of health and environmental goods (as measured by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
125  For the Netherlands, the correct discount rate for monetary costs has been estimated to 
be about 4%, while the correct differential discount rate for health has been estimated to be 
about 1.5%. Rogier M. Klok et al., Towards a Healthier Discount Procedure, 5 EXPERT 
REV. PHARMACOECONOMICS OUTCOMES RES. 59, 62 (2005). Before switching to equal 
discounting in 2004, the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence specified differential discount rates of 6% for costs and 1.5% for effects. 
Werner B. F. Brouwe et al., Need for Differential Discounting of Costs and Health Effects 
in Cost Effectiveness Analyses, 331 BRITISH MED. J. 446 (2005).  
126  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9 at 34; see also 
Graham et al., supra note 28, at 991. 
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individuals’ willingness to pay for them, and the amount individuals must 
be compensated before they would willingly give them up) seem to be 
rising over time. Subpart B again discusses the work of Sunstein and 
Rowell and notes that—in a paper that purports to make the case for equal 
discounting—they actually agree in theory to what others have called 
differential discounting; if this proposal by Sunstein and Rowell were 
actually operationalized, it would go a long way toward improving the 
accuracy and rationality of agency cost-benefit analyses. 
 
A. MARGINAL UTILITY 
  According to the OMB Guidelines, “if consumption continues to 
increase over time, as it has for most of U.S. history, an increment of 
consumption will be less valuable in the future than it would be today, 
because the principle of diminishing marginal utility
127
 implies that as total 
consumption increases, the value of a marginal unit of consumption tends 
to decline.”128 But, whether additional units of a good will have a declining 
marginal utility will depend on what, exactly, the good is. While some 
goods (e.g., money) do have a diminishing marginal utility, other goods 
(e.g., saved lives) do not. 
   As discussed in Part I.A.3.a., supra, the welfare economics premise of 
CBA is that a regulation’s true net benefits will be equal to the sum of all 
the welfare changes (positive and negative) for all who will be affected by 
the regulation. While improving net social welfare may not be the only goal 
of government, the impact of a proposed regulation on total social 
welfare—assuming, arguendo, that changes in social welfare can be 
estimated in any meaningful way—would be at least a relevant 
consideration for most policy makers. In part because it is impossible to 
know precisely how much “welfare” each affected individual will derive 
from any regulation, in practice even the best CBA can only generate a 
very rough estimate of the net social benefits (or costs) of the proposal. In 
cost-benefit analysis, as it is actually practiced, a dollar given today to 
Mark Zuckerberg is considered to improve societal well-being just as much 
as a dollar given today to a family living in poverty. In reality, there is a 
greater social welfare gain when a dollar is given to the family living in 
poverty, because Mark Zuckerberg is a billionaire with so many dollars that 
one additional unit of this good will have little or no impact on his welfare. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
127  Marginal utility is the extra utility derived from each additional unit of a commodity. 
See MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 89, at 57. Beyond a certain point, “marginal utility 
declines as the amount consumed increases.” Id. at 59. The law of diminishing marginal 
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128  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 32 (footnote 
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 However, because the United States is projected to become wealthier 
over time,
130
 discounting the value of future dollars beyond what is 
necessary to control for inflation is seen as a way to account for the fact 
that each additional unit of money is worth more to the present than it will 
be to the wealthier future.
131
 While an analyst cannot easily account for the 
difference in value between a dollar given to a rich person today and a 
dollar given to a poor person today, by discounting money she can at least 
account for the difference in value between a dollar given to the wealthier 
future, as opposed to the comparatively poor present. 
 But not all goods have a diminishing marginal utility, and so not all 
goods need to be discounted to account for this phenomenon. As others—
primarily in the health economics literature dealing with cost-effectiveness 
analysis—have pointed out, the marginal utility of health is very unlikely to 
fall as quickly as the marginal utility of money as wealth increases.
132
 
 It is possible that as the United States becomes wealthier, we will spend 
a greater percentage of our money purchasing healthy food, health club 
memberships, and preventative care. But it is also possible that we will 
consume more energy from polluting sources, buy more large SUVs, and 
take other actions that further decrease our air quality, thereby causing 
more asthma attacks and upper respiratory infections, negatively impacting 
maternal and fetal health, and further increasing the number of days parents 
are asked to keep children in especially polluted areas from playing outside. 
If current trends continue, our rates of obesity and diabetes are projected to 
continue rising in the future.
133
 In short, it is possible that, as our nation’s 
wealth grows, our health will improve in lockstep, but many of our current 
health and consumption patterns would seem to counsel against assuming 
such a relationship. Similarly, an analyst should not assume, without 
evidence, that the marginal utility of clean water will decrease as we get 
wealthier or that the marginal utility of unpolluted air will decrease over 
time.
134
 In fact, an inverse relationship may be more likely, because these 
goods may become scarcer as wealth and consumption increase. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
129  While some analysts do recommend weighting any benefits that accrue to the poor, 
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130  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 36.  
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132  E.g., Gravelle et al., supra note 45, at 307. 
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Dynamic Modeling of Incidence, Mortality, and Prediabetes Prevalence, POPULATION 
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134  See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 29, at 1159. 
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 For some health goods, marginal utility does not diminish at all. Just as 
it is easy to imagine having so much money that an additional dollar 
matters little, it is possible to imagine a future population so robustly 
healthy that it places a rather low value on additional units of “healthiness.” 
But it is very difficult to imagine having so many people alive that we don’t 
care whether additional children are killed in traffic accidents. While the 
marginal utility of some goods, arguably even some health goods, falls as 
more goods are acquired, it is extremely unlikely that in the future the sheer 
number of people alive will make us less interested in saving their lives. 
 Lives saved by regulation are goods that must be included in the cost-
benefit calculus; however, averted deaths are one case where the value to 
society of each additional unit does not decrease as more units are acquired. 
In short, if the country is projected to become wealthier, then discounting 
money to account for its diminished marginal utility is certainly 
appropriate. However, increased wealth will not necessary decrease the 
marginal utility of health and environmental goods. In fact, even increased 
health would not necessarily decrease the marginal utility of certain of 
these goods, such as averted deaths. 
 
B. AS WEALTH INCREASES, THE ACTUAL VALUES OF HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS INCREASE 
 A related reason to use a lower discount rate for health and 
environmental goods than for monetary costs is to account for the fact that 
the actual monetized values of health and environmental goods are rising. 
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) are the two 
methods principally used to arrive at dollar values for goods that are not 
traded in markets, and therefore don’t have a ready price. WTP is the 
highest price one is willing to pay for a good, while WTA is the minimum 
price one would accept to sell it.
135
 (For health and environmental goods, 
WTA values generally exceed WTP values.
136
 While in theory the choice 
between WTP and WTA values should be determined by who has the 
stronger rights interest in the good in question—the public or the entity 
being regulated
137—in practice, WTP is the measure that is nearly always 
used in CBAs.) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
135  See Richard O. Zerbe, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal? Three Rules, 17 J. POL’Y 
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 Evidence shows that our WTP for environmental goods is increasing as 
wealth increases,
138
 and though WTA values for environmental goods are 
not tied as directly to wealth, it makes sense that wealthier individuals (and 
societies, for that matter) can better afford to decline opportunities to sell 
their environmental resources. Similarly, as our wealth increases, our WTP 
and WTA values for health goods will also tend to grow; this phenomenon 
is illustrated by the fact that wealthier countries have much higher WTP 
and WTA values for health gains and losses than developing nations.
139
 
Indeed, “the evidence that [the value of a statistical life] increases with 
wealth is quite strong.”140 
 Sunstein and Rowell, in addressing this relationship between the value 
of a statistical life (VSL) and wealth, make a proposal that—if actually 
operationalized—could go a long way toward improving agencies’ 
economic analyses of regulations: 
As we have noted, it is correct to say that national wealth tends to increase 
over time, and hence people will likely be wealthier in twenty years than 
they now are. Because they will be wealthier, they will demand more to 
be subject to statistical risks. For this reason, use of the current VSL to 
calculate monetary amounts in the future likely produces unjustifiably low 
numbers. But these are not points against discounting. They simply 
suggest that the numbers that must be discounted are higher than 
regulators currently recognize. The proper analysis uses a multiplier for 
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national income growth and any other relevant factors, and applies a 
discount rate from that point.
141 
This concession, coming as it does from the current head of OIRA, in a 
paper that purports to make the case for equal discounting, is staggering. 
Compare the italicized portion of the quote above with the following quote, 
which is taken from an article that makes the case for differential 
discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis: “This discount rate for health 
effects is equal approximately to the discount rate for costs minus the 
annual rate of increase in the value of health.”142 Sunstein and Rowell’s 
version of equal discounting of lives saved is mathematically identical to 
the differential discounting being promoted by some health economists for 
use in cost-effectiveness analysis.   
  To meet the standard for a “proper analysis” described by Sunstein and 
Rowell, any equal discounting of monetary and health goods should be 
preceded by the appropriate use of multipliers. Unfortunately, their 
proposal has not been incorporated into the OMB Guidelines, and the 
agency analysts who draft the CBAs reviewed by OIRA still do not apply 
“multipliers for national income growth and other factors” before 
subjecting intangible public health and environmental benefits to the same 





 A 1982 “Handbook on Economic Analysis,” meant to provide guidance 
to the practical economist conducting cost-benefit analysis for the 
government, provides a number of differential escalation factors intended 
to account for the fact that not all goods factored into the CBA should be 
discounted at some universal rate.
144
 The 1982 handbook contemplates 
different discount factors within the same analysis.
145
 But, over time, the 
notion that different rates might be used to discount different goods within 
a single CBA has completely lost credibility among practitioners, to the 
point where both the OMB and leading CBA theorists now maintain there 
                                                                                                                                                                          
141  Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 18, at 186–87 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
While this article was in press, a paper was published that develops and defends a 
discounting methodology that would work in a similar manner to the Sunstein/Rowell 
“multiplier” proposal. Trachtenberg, supra note 123. Adoption of Trachtenberg’s 
methodology, like the adoption of the Sunstein/Rowell proposal, would be a substantial 
improvement over the way discounting is currently handled in CBAs.  
142
  Gravelle et al., supra note 45, at 307. 
143  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 9; see also 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST, supra note 9 (directing agencies to 
follow the OMB Guidelines).  
144  RESEARCH AND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 115–
16, F2–F8 (1982). 
145  See, e.g., id. at 116, F2–F8. 
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 While it is probably true that most analysts who produce CBAs for 
government agencies have long been resigned to the decades-old 
requirement for equal discounting, it is important to remember that this 
requirement was first instated by an OMB with an openly deregulatory 
agenda and which consistently selected anti-regulation methodologies. The 
decision to use equal discounting in regulatory CBAs was not really a case 
of the better-reasoned argument prevailing in the free marketplace of ideas. 
 If an agency must conduct a CBA on a regulation expected to generate 
public health or environmental benefits, a better strategy would be to 
discount any non-monetary goods at the correct rate for that particular good 
in that particular analysis. For health and environmental goods, that rate 
should generally be significantly lower than the rate used for money. The 
time has come for OMB to reconsider its long-standing directive that 
executive agencies must always discount health and environmental benefits 
at the same rate as monetary costs; failing this, and given that OMB’s 
methodological guidelines are not actually binding on the agencies, 
executive agency analysts should nevertheless consider differential 
discounting of health and environmental goods to be a legitimate—and 
logically defensible—option. 
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